



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 






Sar A. Levitan 
George Washington University 
 
Garth L. Mangum 










Chapter 1 (pp. 1-92) in: 
The T in CETA: Local and National Perspectives 
Sar A. Levitan, and Garth L. Mangum, eds. 





Copyright ©1981. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
Summary of Findings 
and Recommendations
Sar A. Levitan and Garth L. Mangum
The basic premise of the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA) was that local decisionmakers could 
design and deliver services more appropriate to their local 
economies and populations than any nationally uniform pro 
gram. Therefore, the nature, quality, and effectiveness of 
the programs offered by 476 prime sponsors manifests great 
diversity. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some 
generalizations from examination of the national enroll 
ment, costs, and outcomes data and from intensive study of 
the training activities of 12 prime sponsorships. First, the 
conclusions and then the supporting arguments:
1. CETA training is a sound social investment. The na 
tional data suggest that the social returns for each dollar 
spent on CETA-funded classroom training amount to $1.14, 
while each dollar spent for on-the-job training (OJT) returns 
$2.28. When public service employment is conducted as OJT 
in the public sector, it too has a substantial payoff, but that 
is not true of run-of-the-mill work experience projects.
2. The quality of CETA classroom training is primarily a 
product of the local institutions. Prime sponsors normally 
buy services from whatever training entities exist in the com 
munity. Fortunately, more prime sponsors have access to 
some high-quality training institutions, but the others must 
settle for what is available. However, though CETA may 
have had limited impact on the quality of training available 
in most communities, it has had a major impact on the will 
ingness of training institutions to enroll and serve 
economically disadvantaged trainees.
3. The dependence of CETA on the availability and quali 
ty of the local training system applies to other services. Most 
often, the CETA prime sponsor functions as a broker and 
coordinator of services rather than as a service deliverer. The 
chief elected official and prime sponsor staff can encourage 
quality services but, with few exceptions, cannot deliver 
them. The prime sponsors depend, therefore, on the perfor 
mance of: (1) the education and training institutions; (2) the 
public employment service, which provides labor market in 
formation, certification of eligibility, payment of 
allowances, operation of intake and assessment centers, 
marketing of OJT, and other linkages with the employer 
community; and (3) local community-based organizations, 
which are spotty as to their service delivery capacity but im 
portant for their client-advocacy role.
4. Judged by the quality of facilities, equipment, cur 
riculum, and instruction, the quality ranking of training in 
stitutions in descending order tends to be: (1) private pro 
prietary schools, (2) public vocational and technical schools, 
(3) skill centers developed under the auspices of the Man 
power Development and Training Act (MDTA) between 
1963 and 1973, and (4) training activities of community- 
based organizations. However, choice among institutions is 
complicated by the fact that ranking in terms of ability to 
understand, relate to, and serve the disadvantaged is exactly 
the opposite. Therefore, prime sponsors are constantly forc 
ed to compromise between these two sharply differing 
measures of quality.
5. While CETA training is a continuum of earlier pro 
grams, significant changes have evolved. The most notable 
changes developed under CETA are:
a. Greater utilization of broad occupational offer 
ings, achieved primarily through referral of eligible 
individuals to mainstream training programs in 
private and public schools and colleges.
b. The expansion of nonoccupational training ac 
tivities such as remedial basic education, English as 
a second language, prevocational orientation, and 
job-search training.
c. Participation by communities not previously serv 
ed.
d. The additional or expanded use of new service 
deliverers.
6. Persistent obstacles to improvement of the system are:
a. The federal prime sponsor rating system credits 
procedure rather than substance and neither 
measures nor rewards quality.
b. The data system measures short run rather than 
long-run outcomes. Longer-duration training has a 
higher rate of return than training of short dura 
tion. To date, only the short-run data have been 
available to decisionmakers.
c. CETA has not succeeded in linking its offerings 
with complementary services offered by the pro 
grams or sequencing the training and services it of 
fers.
d. The high payoff of OJT is also not apparent to the 
prime sponsor in the short run. Marketing OJT is 
expensive for prime sponsors in terms of staff time 
expended. In addition, the subsidy, equalling 50 
percent of the wage for a few weeks, tends to be 
primarily attractive to marginal employers.
e. The allowance system distorts incentives for under 
taking training. Many of the disadvantaged 
clientele must have financial support to afford 
training participation, but uniform allowances at 
the level of the federal minimum wage for all 
enrollees appear to encourage some to participate 
more for the sake of the allowance than for the 
training.
f. The federal budgetary process denies prime spon 
sors opportunity for long-range planning.
g. The federal staff is ill-equipped to provide useful 
technical assistance.
h. Both prime sponsor and federal staff lack training 
backgrounds.
Still, there is reason to take satisfaction in CETA training 
accomplishments, but there is ample opportunity to make a 
sound system better. The key steps are:
1. Training and employability development should be 
made the highest priority of the CETA system.
2. The system should encourage and support a two-tiered 
structure of classroom instruction, consisting of a 
remedial career-entry phase, designed to serve the 
disadvantaged with remedial education, career ex 
ploration, job-search training, and occupational skills 
that can be acquired in no more than 36 weeks; and a 
career-development phase available to those who prove 
themselves in the first phase.
3. To induce employers to provide on-the-job training, 
subsidies should cover a "try-out" period during 
which the trainee is in the workplace but receiving a 
CETA stipend until the employer has an opportunity 
to assess the trainee's worth. Public service employ 
ment should, in most cases, function similarly, as 
public sector OJT.
4. The training allowance system should be reformed to 
include: (1) reimbursement for the out-of-pocket ex 
penses of training participation, paid to all, (2) a sub 
sistence component based on family income, and (3) a 
cash incentive for high performance.
5. The federal funding commitment should be made to 
prime sponsors at least 2 years ahead.
6. An aggressive personnel exchange system should give 
federal, state, and local staff substantial experience at 
each of those levels.
7. A technical assistance, staff training, and curriculum 
development entity should be developed that is capable 
of bringing meaningful help to the local level.
8. A rating system should be devised stressing qualitative 
factors and rewarding positive long-range results. The 
system should reflect data derived from the Con 
tinuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey upon which 
the first point of this summary was based.
9. There should be constant experimentation in search for 
improvements in the quality and outcomes of training. 
The adaptation by local training institutions of 
computer-assisted and computer-managed instruction, 
already proven in Job Corps to be effective with a 
disadvantaged population, deserves serious considera 
tion.

1. The Scope of CETA Training
Antecedents
Congress passed the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act in 1973 with the aim of consolidating federal 
employment and training resources. Chief elected officials, 
known in CETA parlance as prime sponsors, representing 
local units of government with populations of more than 
100,000 and states on behalf of smaller areas, were eligible to 
participate in the program. Prime sponsors were to plan, 
design and administer local programs consistent with general 
federal guidelines, subject to local advisory council review 
and regional Department of Labor approval.
CETA is best understood and appraised as a continuation 
of employment and training programs that had existed since 
the early 1960s under the Manpower Development and 
Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 and the Economic Opportuni 
ty Act (EOA) of 1964. It made available under one 
authorization a range of services aimed at improving the 
employability and earnings experience of workers from low- 
income households. On the administrative side, CETA 
transferred decisionmaking authority at the state and local 
level from the state employment service, state boards of 
vocational education, and local community action agencies 
to elected officials identified as prime sponsors.
This study is illuminated by the recognition that CETA in 
herited from its predecessor programs the institutions or ser 
vices they established, though significant changes have been 
made in the ways in which those institutions are used and in
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the mix of services provided. Labor market interventions 
under CETA's predecessors were limited to classroom and 
on-the-job training, remedial education, work experience, 
subsidized public employment, and supportive services to 
make participation in the other components possible. CETA 
has added to this list a range of nonoccupational training. As 
the program's title indicates, its offerings can be divided be 
tween those that stress job creation and those that emphasize 
employability development. The latter is the focus of this 
study.
Prior to CETA, training occurred primarily in three in 
stitutional settings, with minor use of a fourth. Initially, 
most training was offered to class-size groups in existing 
public vocational education facilities. This arrangement suf 
fered from serious drawbacks. First, the training was often 
offered at inconvenient hours because the facilities were fully 
utilized during regular school schedules. Second, the schools 
offered the trainees a limited range of occupational choices. 
Third, the out-of-school population of generally limited 
education was taught by instructors accustomed to, and with 
pedagogy designed for, mainstream in-school youth.
An alternative soon emerged that attempted to correct the 
first and second problems. The remedy was tuition payment 
for, and referral of, individuals to ongoing postsecondary 
vocational and technical school programs (known as in 
dividual referral). But that was useful only for those who 
could compete with the regular student body.
The third alternative was the skill center. This new institu 
tion was developed specifically to meet the needs of MDTA 
enrollees drawn mostly from among the poor and deficiently 
educated, classified as the "disadvantaged" population. 
Modular training curricula were structured for adaptations 
to individual instruction, so that trainees could enter im 
mediately upon enrollment, rather than await the start of a
new class, and progress to some extent at their own pace. 
Emphasizing individual needs, trainees could begin without 
prerequisites and leave for employment when their potential, 
their endurance, or their resources were exhausted. Remedial 
education, either preliminary to or integrated with occupa 
tional training, was available to those who needed it. The 
skill centers also provided supportive services, centering on 
the personal problems faced by the trainees. The services in 
cluded advocacy counseling to help with personal problems, 
transportation, minor health care, child care, job develop 
ment and placement. The skill centers utilized whatever low 
cost facilities were available, burdening the centers and their 
trainees with an unfortunate stigma. Observers expressed 
concern that the student body included a mixture of the up 
wardly yearning and those attracted mainly by the stipends.
Since the state boards of vocational education were 
responsible for providing the training sites, limited use was 
made of private training institutions. Occasionally training 
was contracted with private proprietary schools. Additional 
possibilities that emerged out of the antipoverty movement 
were the community action agencies (CAAs) and the 
community-based organizations (CBOs). Only a few CAAs, 
the Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC), and the 
Operation Service-Employment-Redevelopment (SER), and 
organization oriented toward serving Mexican-Americans, 
played significant training roles during that period.
A technical assistance operation known as AMIDS (Area 
Manpower Institutes for the Development of Staff) provided 
inservice staff training, curriculum development, and other 
help directly to the federally supported training sites, but 
these disappeared with the advent of CETA.
Given the limited resources and the clamor for enrollment 
by the eligible population, program administrators attemp 
ted to ease the conflict by cutting the duration of training
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and making it possible to enroll more applicants in training 
programs. The problem was compounded by the fact that 
enrollees were paid stipends, consisting of the average state 
unemployment compensation payment plus allowances for 
dependents and training-related out-of-pocket costs for 
adults, and lesser amounts for unmarried youths. The 
stipends consumed half of the resources. The law also re 
quired restricting training to occupations having 
"reasonable expectations of employment."
This combination of a disadvantaged clientele, pressures 
for immediate placement, and the short duration of courses 
limited the training choice to entry-level preparation for oc 
cupations requiring rudimentary skill and characterized by 
high turnover rates. Three-quarters of all pre-CETA 
classroom enrollments were in seven occupational categories 
and all at the entry level: clerical, health care, automotive 
repair, machine operation, welding, building service, and 
food service.
On-the-job training began slowly and accelerated so that 
by 1968 about half of MDTA's enrollments were in OJT 
slots. Representatives of the public employment services or 
community-based organizations offered employers an 
average of $25 a week for 26 weeks (the equivalent of 15.6 
hours pay at the minimum wage in the early 1970s) as a sub 
sidy for hiring MDTA eligibles. Predictably, only the small 
marginal employers were attracted by the subsidies and then 
only if the most qualified among the eligible were selected. 
Since these employers normally lacked training capability, 
the subsidy primarily bought a placement in a low-paying 
job. Nevertheless, the costs were low and the placement was 
built in, with retention likely, so a high ratio of benefits to 
costs was assured.
CETA was introduced, not because MDTA and EGA were 
failures, but because it was thought that local political ac-
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countability would produce a service mix, including training, 
better adapted to the local scene. In addition, it was assumed 
that quality would improve if local institutions had to com 
pete for the right to provide GET A services. Focusing on 
what has happened to the quality and effectiveness of train 
ing under CETA should help answer whether those assump 
tions were correct.
Magnitude of CETA Training
Under CETA, the nation's commitments to employment 
and training programs rose dramatically, but employment 
generation captured the lion's share of dollars and people. 
There were over 2 million new enrollees in CETA programs 
in fiscal 1980. Over two-thirds of these new participants were 
in work components, or nearly half if the youth summer pro 
gram enrollments are excluded. Job creation components 
also accounted for two-thirds of the 1 million service years of 
employment and training activity estimated for fiscal 1980. 
The number and distribution of service years by program 
components follow:
Service years Percent 
CETA component (000) distribution
Total 1,097.5 100.0 
Local programs 1,041.8 95.2
Classroom training 219.9 20.0
On-the-job training 54.3 4.9
Summer youth work experience 126.2 11.9
Youth transition services 41.3 3.7
Nonsummer work experience 252.3 23.0
Public service employment 347.8 31.7
Job Corps 35.7 3.2
National programs 20.0 1.8
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Whereas training expenditures predominated in the policy 
mix prior to CETA (accounting, for example, for nearly 2 of 
every 3 dollars expended in 1969), they fell to less than a 
fourth of CETA outlays by 1974 and to only 15 percent in 
1978, before rebounding to 21 percent in 1980. The source of 
the relative shift was massive allocations to job creation 
rather than decreases in training funds. In fact, with plen 
tiful employment funding under other titles after 1975 and 
with public sector employment proscribed under Title IIBC 
after 1978 (the title giving prime sponsors the most discretion 
to choose among alternative services), more of that title's 
funds could be expended on classroom training and OJT, as 
follows:








The relative distribution of training dollars has also 
shifted during the first 6 years of CETA. OJT has accounted 
for between 8.7 percent and 13.8 percent of Title I or IIBC 
expenditures, while the share of classroom training during 
the same period rose from 34.4 percent to 57.1 percent of 
IIBC allocations.
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The rising expenditures for training have provided oppor 
tunities for an increasing number of persons in need. The 
new participants, or annual flow through training programs 
each year, rose rapidly over the early 1960s to 336,000 an 
nually in fiscal 1967. The participant levels reached 481,000 
annually by 1972, and declined during the next 4 years. 
Growth resumed in 1976, reaching a peak of 773,000 in 1978, 
followed by a decline over the succeeding 2 years. Most of 
the secular increase resulted from the growth of local 
classroom training enrollments. In fact, average OJT par 
ticipants during the first 6 years of CETA were only two- 
thirds the average from 1969 to 1974. With the erosions of 
inflation and the beginnings of budget cuts, the pattern of 







































This study focuses on the regular and continuing funding 
that Congress appropriated for training under CETA, ex 
clusive of Job Corps. In addition to direct allocations to 
prime sponsors, funds were also allocated under Title IIBC 
to state governors for vocational education. Other training 
funds came from youth training programs, a special ap 
propriation for a demonstration skill training improvement 
program (STIP), a private sector initiative program (PSIP), 
and other titles of CETA. The Title IIBC formula allocation 
has accounted for about half of the CETA training, as the
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percentage breakdown of fiscal 1980 enrollments and expen 
ditures indicates:
(percent distribution)
Expenditures by Participants by
program program 
Source of Funds components components
Total training 100.0 100.0
IIBC 49.9 61.0 
Supplemental vocational
education 4.7 * 
HD 1.4 2.1
III 1.5 3.3 
STIP 2.6 1.3
IV
Youth employment 6.5 11.8 
Job Corps 28.0 9.3
VI 0.7 0.6
VII (PSIP) 4.7 10.6
'Participants counted under Title IIBC in CETA MIS reports.
2. Local Vantage
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act pro 
vided funds in 1980 to 476 state and local govern 
ments—known as prime sponsors—for the delivery of ser 
vices designed to improve the skills and the employment op 
portunities of low-income individuals experiencing dif 
ficulties in the labor market. While not necessarily represen 
tative, the 12 intensive case studies are a microcosm of the 
CETA system. This can be demonstrated by first comparing 
them on a few key variables with national averages. The 
quality and effectiveness of the training provided by each 
prime sponsor is assessed, and the aspects of regulation and 
administration that have an impact on quality are reviewed. 
The national and local reviews then become the source of 
conclusions and lessons related to the entire system.
Classroom Training
Allocation Determinants
Nationally, prime sponsors enrolled half of their Title 
IIBC participants in classroom training. Most of the prime 
sponsors interviewed indicated a preference for classroom 
training, and all but Baltimore, San Francisco, and North 
Carolina balance of state enrolled a higher proportion than 
the national average in classroom training. But because of
15
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variations in costs per enrollee, expenditure patterns did not 
coincide with those for enrollments, as indicated below:
Classroom training under Title IIBC, fiscal year 1980
Percent of Percent of 
Location total participants total expenditures




Montgomery 62.4 48.4 
North Carolina balance
of state 39.6 33.6
Ottawa 62.5 18.9
Penobscot 53.2 2L6





Nationally, neither the local unemployment rate nor the 
age structure of the participant population explain the dif 
ferences in service mix. Also, in making cross-prime-sponsor 
comparisons, it is not certain that common definitions were 
used. It might also be expected that classroom training 
would decrease with rising unemployment; however, the op 
posite has tended to be true. As unemployment has risen, 
more Title IID and VI PSE funds became available, thereby 
freeing up Title IIBC money for added training. On a cross- 
sectional basis, there is a tendency for those prime sponsors 
with the lowest unemployment rates to show the greatest 
commitment to classroom training, a relationship which 
does not hold true for on-the-job training. The major depar 
tures from this generalization are those less-populated areas 
with limited access to training institutions or private 
employers.
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1980 civilian 1980 unemployment
labor force rate
Location (000) (percent)




Montgomery 309 3.5 
North Carolina balance
of state 1,684 7.1
Ottawa 70 4.7
Penobscot 87 6.4





Prime sponsors have also complained about the require 
ment of maintaining the same level of service to youth under 
Title IIBC after the addition of new Title IV youth programs 
in 1977. This provision forced them to emphasize work ex 
perience under Title IIBC, since this was the most common 
youth activity in this title. Yet, the studies found no consis 
tent correlation, positive or negative, between the share of 
IIBC funds devoted to youth activities and the ratio of train 
ing to work experience under that title.
Institutional Setting
The providers of classroom training varied widely among 
the 12 sites studied. In Seattle, Tucson, and Utah, the major 
providers were the skill centers, which originated under 
MDTA. In San Francisco, the use of community-based 
organizations was favored, along with minor use of a skill 
center and a substantial amount of individual referral to 
private schools and the community college system. In North 
Carolina, the community colleges and technical institutes 
had most of the action, as was the case in Penobscot, where
18
private colleges rounded out the classroom training facilities. 
In Dallas, two school districts and two CBOs shared most of 
the training activity. The overriding concern was with pro 
viding low per-capita cost training. Baltimore and Worcester 
used a mix of public and private schools and some employers 
to provide classroom training. Rural Ottawa County, lack 
ing training facilities of its own, provided living expenses and 
tuition aid to send many of its trainees out of the area. Some 
of the more rural areas of the Penobscot consortium follow 
ed a similar practice. Montgomery County enrolled its 
trainees in public and private schools, as well as local col 
leges. Indianapolis relied wholly on individual referrals to 
public and private colleges.
To generalize from the case studies, public postsecondary 
schools seem to provide most of the training, with skill 
centers in second place, followed by CBO-run schools and 
then private proprietary schools. In contrast to the national 
picture where individual referral purportedly predominates, 
enrollments in class-size groups were more common than in 
dividual referrals in all of the study locations, but this was 
true primarily because of the unusual CBO delivery system in 
San Francisco, Seattle, and Dallas.
Though skill centers played the predominate role in three 
locations, they were important in two others and supplemen 
tal in one. In Seattle, Tucson, and Utah, the skill centers pro 
vided the bulk of occupational training for the prime spon 
sor, but, in Baltimore and San Francisco, the skill center had 
a limited CETA role. These MDTA institutions still seem to 
be characterized by the same advantages and shortcomings 
they offered during the earlier period. Their staffs are 
typically dedicated to serving a disadvantaged population, 
and a range of on-site services required by disadvantaged 
trainees is generally available. On the other hand, the train 
ing tends to be limited to an average of 26 weeks and a max 
imum of 36 weeks (except for health care occupations where
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licensing requirements require longer training periods); the 
facilities are often poor, though the equipment is generally 
adequate, and the institutions are likely to have low prestige 
in the community.
Most skill centers make use of existing structure. For in 
stance, the Tucson skill center was initially housed in aban 
doned department store, garage, and restaurant buildings. In 
Utah, one skill center is in a former laundry building and 
another, in what was formerly a high school. The Baltimore 
skill center is also in an abandoned high school, as is the 
Dallas facility, although the latter has been lavishly remodel 
ed. The San Francisco skill center is housed in an abandoned 
elementary school. However, the latter institution has lost 
most of the attributes that typify a skill center. The Seattle 
facility, which was the major provider of CETA occupa 
tional training in that city, was exceptional in being the only 
center built for that purpose. Owned and operated by the 
Seattle Opportunities Industrialization Center, it has the 
allegiance of its enrollees and the black community, but 
although it is well-designed and -equipped, it still does not 
appear to command the general prestige that its quality 
deserves.
Beyond these examples of MDTA continuance, the oc 
cupational training locus seems to have shifted to standard 
public vocational schools and proprietary schools, sup 
plemented by specialized programs run by CBOs. In the 
mainstream public and private institutions, which serve the 
general population, CETA enrollees are referred individually 
to the regular program, with any necessary fees paid from 
CETA funds. This approach provides the CETA enrollee 
with training as good as that available to the taxpaying or 
feepaying public and allows participants to report to peers or 
prospective employers, "I'm at the technical college," rather 
than, "I'm in CETA."
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The drawback is that only those who are fairly self- 
motivated and who can compete with the regular clientele in 
the school will last. Some schools do provide remedial educa 
tion, but that is not the norm. A few prime sponsors follow a 
sequencing process in which an enrollee can spend time in a 
remedial component at one institution and then be referred 
to a skill training institution. However, almost every CETA 
prime sponsor has far more applicants than available slots, 
and the case studies found waiting lists for training ranging 
from 3 to 6 months. Thus, most sponsors considered it in 
equitable to invest heavily in some eligible persons, thereby 
leaving no funds for others. The regional office staff, and 
national policy as well, reinforced this concern by inveighing 
against high per-capita cost and setting up an assessment 
system that commends program for combining low costs and 
high immediate placements but largely ignores the quality of 
training offered.
Community-based organizations also play a larger role 
under CETA than they did under MDTA. The Opportunities 
Industrialization Centers (QIC) have been in the skill train 
ing business since the mid-1960s and in many cities provide 
high-quality training in a wide range of occupations. The 
Seattle OIC, as noted, is an outstanding example. However, 
in many other cities the OIC offering is limited and, in some 
places, of low quality. OIC provided a narrow range of 
training in Dallas and North Carolina, and it had been drop 
ped for poor performance in San Francisco and Mont 
gomery County. Often, as in Dallas, the prime sponsor must 
share responsibility for not simultaneously supporting and 
spurring the CBO to higher-quality efforts.
While OIC offers occupational skills, other CBOs tend to 
restrict their offerings to remedial prevocational components 
and to sponsorship of on-the-job training. However, the 
trend is for local community-based organizations to add 
entry-level skill training components. Facilities tend to be
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unsatisfactory, but the training emphasizes those occupa 
tions that require little training equipment. CBOs are par 
ticularly effective where the primary concern is with the in 
struction of English as a second language. In some cases, the 
support of CBOs may be motivated by a desire to "give them 
a small contract to keep them alive." However, the San 
Francisco and Seattle CBOs are both politically potent and 
offer highly competent instruction.
Training Occupations
High turnover occupations predominated among the 
training activities of the 12 case studies. Most of the 
enrollments seem to be in clerical, health care, automotive 
and auto repair, welding, machine operation, building ser 
vice and food service, just as they have been since the days of 
MDTA, but some significant change has occurred. Clerical 
and health care occupations are, in generally high demand so 
that, depending upon the level of investment in time and 
training costs, jobs can be found at lower or higher levels 
within the occupational cluster. Given the backgrounds of 
the enrollees and the relatively short training time allowed in 
most CETA programs, the clerical trainees tend to attain on 
ly marginal levels of skills. Yet the demand is sufficient in 
most locations to assure a respectable placement rate in the 
60- to 80-percent range. Admission to health programs tends 
to be more selective. Training for licensed practical or voca 
tional nurses, an MDTA creation, continues to be the 
outstanding CETA health care program. Training extends 
from 36 to 52 weeks, and placement is almost guaranteed if 
state certification standards are met. Yet, within the health 
care category, the Nurse's Aide Academy program in Dallas 
is evidence that programs of short duration can be produc 
tive when attuned to the needs of the client population and 
the demands of the labor market.
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There seems to be a small and sporadic, but still signifi 
cant, trend toward a broadened occupational range in class- 
size projects. Training for computer-related occupations and 
office machine repair are on the increase. Other occupations 
are added from time to time in response to local economic 
conditions, but the conditions and the programs rarely con 
tinue over long periods of time. In fact, CETA-funded train 
ing activities appear to be more flexible in phasing in or out 
according to community need than is common among train 
ing institutions.
The trend toward increased use of individual referral has 
expanded the range of occupations for which training is of 
fered and is nearly as wide as the total offering of the local 
training institutions, but the numbers trained add up to few 
in each occupation. Examples from the 12 case studies in 
clude radiologic, biomedical, psychiatric and graphic 
reproduction technicians, dental hygiene, drafting, air con 
ditioning, computer programming, graphic reproduction 
technician, and cosmetology. However, many of these are 
2-year programs. CETA tries to limit enrollment to 36 
weeks, with an average, scheduled course duration of about 
26 weeks, and it rarely pays for more than 52 weeks of train 
ing. In a few cases, in Penobscot especially, CETA was 
found to be paying tuition allowances for the first half of a 
2-year training program, leaving those who can afford it to 
finish at their own expense. Apparently there is interest in 
long-term training but an unwillingness to pay the price of 
reducing the numbers served since for every person enrolled 
in an expensive long-term training course, others are left 
without service.
To demonstrate the importance of this kind of activity, the 
skill training improvement program (STIP), initiated in 
1977, earmarked funds for both high level skills and long- 
term training. The funds were allocated to prime sponsors on 
a competitive basis. To support the same training for the
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same number of enrollees from regular prime sponsor funds 
would have absorbed a high proportion of available funds 
and resulted in the rejection of many applicants. However, 
the last grants for STIP projects were awarded in the first 
quarter of fiscal year 1979 from fiscal year 1978 funds, and 
no additional funds have been allocated for the program.
Other problems are associated with long-term training. 
Not only are these training programs more costly, but they 
tend to have higher dropout rates and no higher immediate 
placement rates than short-term courses, even though the 
analysis of national data indicates that their payoff in the 
long run is greater. Many eligible people lack the persistence 
and financial ability required to last through a long-term 
training program. They are apparently willing to train for 
the relatively low-paid jobs plagued by high turnover rates 
that seem to be available even during economic slumps.
As a matter of general policy, the Baltimore prime sponsor 
had opted for expensive, longer-term offerings in its regular 
training program. That was achieved at the price of con 
siderable selectivity among applicants. The Seattle skill 
center had historically shown a preference for long-term 
training, thereby contributing to criticisms of high per- 
capital cost. Worcester's largest skill training activity was in 
low-level clerical skills, but it had also carefully selected 
enrollees for electronics and computer programs. Mont 
gomery County tried high-level skills on an individual basis 
without stipends but had to screen 1,100 applicants to find 
33 persons qualified for a biomedical technician program. 
Several others had similar experiences with STIP. While the 
completion rates in these long-term offerings were generally 
lower than in short-term courses, those who completed were 
placed in jobs with considerably higher pay.
Success at running long-term training for high-level oc 
cupations presupposes either concentration on a better-
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prepared segment of the CETA-eligible population or a 
greater investment in remedial activities. The Baltimore 
prime sponsor has clearly made the selectivity choice for oc 
cupational training, as has Worcester for some of its pro 
grams. Utah and Penobscot had CETA-eligible populations, 
which in general had these characteristics, but they had not 
chosen to invest in long-term training. Tucson has chosen to 
serve a population ready and willing to qualify for 
minimum-wage jobs, while San Francisco stressed relatively 
low-cost English as a second language for predominately 
female immigrants. Dallas chose to focus on a needy black 
population but then failed to adjust the curriculum to meet 
those new needs. For others, the choice between lower-level 
enrollees and higher-level skills remains a troublesome one.
On-the-Job Training
Seven of the prime sponsors studied enrolled a larger pro 
portion of their IIBC participants in on-the-job training than 
the national average, including Penobscot and Ottawa, 
which enrolled more than double the national average. The 
variation in the percent of funds and participants enrolled in 
OJT was even greater than in classroom training.
Most of the prime sponsors studied praised OJT but then 
tended to make relatively little use of it. Enrollment in OJT 
ranged from 0.2 to 24.6 percent of the total IIBC enrollment 
in the 12 sites, despite the favorable results already indicated 
and the cost advantages documented below. The key deter 
minant in the use of OJT appeared to be the relative ag 
gressiveness of the agencies accepting the OJT marketing 
assignment, which is usually delegated to the public employ 
ment service, CBOs (especially Urban League), and local Na 
tional Alliance of Business (NAB) chapters.
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On-the-job training under Title IIBC, fiscal 1980
Percent of Percent of
Location total participants total expenditures




Montgomery 1.2 0.6 
North Carolina balance
of state 13.7 12.1
Ottawa 24.6 13.4
Penobscot 23.7 15.9





Penobscot used the state federation of labor as one of its 
OJT developers and had established a well-designed and 
carefully monitored system, linked with other services. 
Worcester had a high-quality, coupled classroom/OJT pro 
gram sponsored by local banks and administered by the local 
NAB chapter. In Seattle, Utah, and North Carolina, the 
employment service marketed OJT far more energetically 
than did the prime sponsor. Ottawa County had no 
classroom training institutions, and OJT served as an alter 
native to sending trainees outside the area at a high cost for 
transportation and lodging; Dallas had the advantage of a 
tight labor market to help "sell" the advantages of on-the- 
job training to employers. Indianapolis used OJT only in 
isolated cases because employers had earlier criticized the 
4 'red tape" that it involved. Private industry councils ex 
pressed interest in OJT promotion but were only beginning 
to get involved in the effort when the case studies were 
prepared.
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For the prime sponsor, a major obstacle to greater use of 
OJT is the high staff costs involved in persuading individual 
employers to contract for OJT slots. Many employers are 
reluctant to take on a CETA enrollee. They tend to question 
the qualifications of the eligible population and are fearful 
about the amount of red tape that may be involved in the 
contracting process. The result is tnat, in most cases, only 
small marginal employers, to whom a half wage subsidy for 
3 to 6 months may be attractive, sign up for one or two 
trainees. Moreover, in some rural areas, an absence of even 
small employers makes the development of OJT contracts 
nearly impossible.
One much-advocated approach to serving the disadvan- 
taged is a remedial education/classroom instruction/on-the- 
job training sequence, which Penobscot had achieved for 
some enrollees. However, given the limited funds available, 
the outside pressures to keep per-capita costs low, and the 
logistical difficulties involved in developing such complex 
programs, most prime sponsors considered it more ap 
propriate, if not more politically expedient, to run three 
parallel programs. The expansion of job-search training 
seems to be adding a fourth parallel track for the job-ready, 
who may need only placement services, but for whom the 
public employment service does not have an appropriate job 
listing. The tendency is for prime sponsors to decide on some 
division of available funds for each of these tracks, contract 
for the needed services, and then monitor the activities under 
each contract.
San Francisco is an example of a prime sponsor that ad 
vocates high-support OJT and has had some positive ex 
perience with it. (The emphasis is reflected in the expenditure 
of a high proportion of funds to support a rather low pro 
portion of its participants.) The program is an example of 
the remediation/classroom training/OJT sequencing pro 
cess. It begins with a commitment from the employer to take
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on one or more of those persons who have successfully com 
pleted the first two training phases—usually with some 
limited right of selection. Often the employer provides a 
training facility at the workplace, along with some equip 
ment and instructional assistance from the company person 
nel office for a work-simulation training phase. Those who 
attain a prescribed performance level, or a predetermined 
proportion of them, are then offered permanent employ 
ment by the firms involved.
Well-paid jobs on a structured promotion ladder, with ac 
companying job security and fringe benefits, have been at 
tained through this route. Examples include employment 
with a grocery chain, a public utility, and an engineering 
association. Nevertheless, the level of enrollments fluctuated 
with the needs of the companies—frequently involving affir 
mative action requirements—and could not be sustained. 
Not only must a willing employer be found, but uncommit 
ted dollars must be available at the appropriate time—and 
these programs tend to be expensive. Both community and 
federal pressures are aimed at committing every expected 
program dollar at the beginning of the fiscal year and 
thereafter keeping costs low. Yet, a cooperating employer 
may find it difficult to adjust his labor needs to the schedule 
of federal fund allocations. Thus, launching a successful 
OJT effort usually involves the fortuitous availability of 
funds that are either uncommitted or deobligated from other 
contractors or prime sponsors.
The San Francisco prime sponsor also offers an illustra 
tion of an approach that is related to the high-support OJT 
program, but is less expensive and therefore has a chance for 
greater continuity of funding. Advocacy organizations for 
minorities, women, and the handicapped are funded for the 
sole purpose of making placements, without offering any ac 
companying remedial education. As a prime sponsor staffer 
put it, representatives of these advocacy groups "follow the
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equal employment opportunity enforcers around offering 
companies relief by providing selected, though CETA- 
eligible, people with the right affirmative action 
characteristics.*'
North Carolina used an alternative approach, called 
"work site assessment," which was funded by the state 
rather than CETA. In this program, workers are paid a sti 
pend by the employment service while they are assigned to a 
host employer's establishment. After a trial period, the 
employer may reject the worker, offer unsubsidized employ 
ment, or accept an OJT contract.
Beyond these few exceptional programs, OJT was a 
useful, if routine, component of each prime sponsor's reper 
toire of program strategies. Its high benefit-cost payoff, 
clearly noted at the national level, was unknown to local 
operators and not readily apparent from any of the data 
available to them. The difficulty of marketing OJT, the high 
administrative cost of the personalized contracting process, 
and the overrepresentation of marginal employers among the 
contractors acted as disincentives to heavy sponsor involve 
ment in that activity. The fact that planned OJT expen 
ditures were substantially greater than actual expenditures 
for most of the prime sponsors indicates both the desire for 
OJT and the difficulties of its promotion.
Nonoccupational Training
The expansion of nonoccupational training is one of the 
most intriguing developments among CETA training ac 
tivities. Included among these efforts are instruction in basic 
education, English as a second language, prevocational 
orientation, coping skills, motivation, and job search train 
ing. These services are sometimes supplied separately and 
sometimes, in any combination, included as adjuncts to oc 
cupational skill training.
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The steady increase in the educational attainment of the 
work force and the decline of jobs that do not require at least 
some reading, writing, and simple arithmetic skills make lack 
of basic education an increasingly serious handicap. General 
education development (GED) certification as a substitute 
for a high school diploma is, therefore, a component of 
growing importance. Many CETA eligibles cannot succeed 
in occupational training without first or simultaneously par 
ticipating in remedial education and often in English as a 
second language. Some programs have demonstrated their 
ability to raise reading and arithmetic performance three 
grade levels during a 12-week course, though the usual pro 
gress is less dramatic.
The persistence of Spanish as the mother tongue among 
rural peoples of the Southwest and Puerto Ricans on the 
East Coast, together with the flood of more recent im 
migrants from Latin America and the Far East, has made 
English as a second language (ESL) the largest training pro 
gram of some prime sponsors. Increasingly, it has become 
vocational English as a second language (VESL) with the ad 
vent of curriculum materials teaching language in a job con 
text. ESL (or VESL) tends to be highly successful in terms of 
placement rates, retention rates, and the gain between pre- 
and post-training wage rates. San Francisco had the widest 
range of ESL offerings among the 12 prime sponsors 
studied, enrolling persons whose native tongue was Spanish, 
Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Vietnamese, Cambodian, In 
donesian, and Russian. Seattle also had a growing ESL com 
ponent, serving various Asian refugees. Dallas and Tucson 
offer ESL for Hispanics, with Operation SER as contractor. 
Other primes had more limited ESL activities. For all of 
these groups, their very presence so far from their points of 
origin is evidence of their motivation, and many have 
substantial skills that can be applied only after language 
competence is obtained.
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North Carolina had the heaviest investment in prevoca- 
tional orientation, with a state appropriation of $2.3 million 
in addition to CETA funding. In 47 of its 58 community and 
technical colleges, CETA and non-CETA disadvantaged 
enrollees are given 8 weeks of a combination of remedial 
education, career exploration, and various life-coping skills. 
The numbers enrolled exceed the numbers enrolled in 
CETA-funded occupational skill training. This human 
resource development (HRD) program emerged as a natural 
consequence of reliance on public postsecondary institu 
tions, which were not prepared to deal with a disadvantaged 
student body. Though it functions within the same institu 
tions, it is separate from and not linked with occupational 
skill training. The Baltimore prime sponsor was unique in 
establishing its own in-house faculty for conducting most 
nonoccupational training as an alternative to contracting it 
out.
The hottest new entry among the nonoccupational pro 
grams is job search training. A person who knows how and 
where to search and how to impress an employer can usually 
find at least a high-turnover, low-paying job. Typically, the 
job search program enrollees are taught during a 2-week 
course to prepare resumes, fill out applications, and practice 
answers to the most common questions asked by interview 
ing employers. The enrollees then learn to use the telephone 
yellow pages and classified advertisement sections in the 
newspapers in order to identify employers likely to have the 
job they want and for which they are qualified. They practice 
telephoning skills and then spend long, supervised hours call 
ing for interview appointments. Reported placement rates 
tended to range from 70 to 90 percent among the cases 
studied, though parallel programs for work incentive pro 
gram (WIN) enrollees in the same cities were observed to 
have as low as 30 percent success rates. Moreover, there is as 
yet no substantial data on retention rates and, more impor-
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tantly, no data on whether or not the participant has obtain 
ed a permanent job-seeking skill, which works in subsequent 
spells of unemployment.
The nonoccupational offerings rest on two assumptions: 
that a high proportion of jobs require no specific pre-entry 
skills and that turnover produces a flow of jobs, even during 
less-than-prosperous times. However, few programs indicate 
how to distinguish between primary and secondary labor 
markets and how to choose and attain jobs with promise. 
Unlike occupational skill training, which is usually provided 
by public education institutions and proprietary schools, 
private contractors appear to dominate nonoccupational 
training, except for ESL where community-based organiza 
tions predominate.
Training Costs
Training costs varied widely across the study sites, but 
gross cost data are of limited value because the scope and 
content of the training differed widely (Table 1 which is 
drawn from national DOL data sources includes only in 
structional and administrative costs but not allowances). On 
ly Indianapolis and Seattle of the 12 prime sponsors exceed 
ed the national average cost per positive termination of 
$3,170, with only Indianapolis recording a higher-than-the- 
average national cost per placement of $6,508.
Important factors in determining the costs per participant 
and per outcome include the ratio of nonskill to skill train 
ing, the average length of training, the occupational mix, the 
institutional mix, the client characteristics, the dropout rate, 
and the extent of local subsidies. Costs per placement or 
costs per positive termination depend, of course, upon the 
characteristics of the participants, the state of the local 
economy, and the availability of positive alternatives to 
placement. According to national data, the positive termina-



































































































































tion rate of all prime sponsors averaged 67 percent. All 12 
prime sponsors studied had a better record than the national 
average by the positive termination criterion, but In 
dianapolis and North Carolina fell below the national 
average in placement rates. The prime sponsors studied con 
sistently reported higher outcomes to the researchers than 
were found in the national data source. The national average 
cost per placement was more than double the outlay per 
positive termination, but only three of the 12 prime sponsors 
exceeded that ratio.
Nationally, costs per participant in classroom training ex 
ceeded OJT costs by 18 percent, but half of the 12 prime 
sponsors expended more funds per OJT than per classroom 
enrollee. The presumed OJT cost advantage was offset in 
many places by the locally subsidized and sometimes tuition- 
free use of public training institutions. Public community 
colleges, technical institutes, and area vocational schools are 
generally eligible for the same average daily attendance fund 
ing whether the student is matriculated or not, and, if tuition 
is not completely free to enrollees, then the cost to the prime 
sponsor is minimal except for the stipend. Another offset 
against the apparently low comparative costs for on-the-job 
training are the promotional costs; because there may be one 
trainee per employer, the staffing requirements for either 
prime sponsor or contractor associated with OJT may exceed 
that of classroom training.
The costs obtainable from national data sources often dif 
fer from data obtained directly from the local level. The 
following locally obtained data are examples of the wide 
variations in costs. At the Baltimore skill center, costs per 
trainee ranged from $1,169 for clerical training to $3,344 for 
construction trades. Individual referral costs were uniform 
at $2,858 because the schools charged the same tuition rates 
for different occupations. When allowances are added, the 
total cost range grew from $2,041 for clerical to $4,696 for
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computer and office machine repair, which involved training 
of longer duration than the construction trades course. Most 
were open entry-open exit programs, and therefore costs are 
determined by the amount of time the average trainee takes 
to complete the programs (or to drop out) rather than any ar 
bitrary, maximum course length. Since individual referral 
courses were fixed in length and tended to be longer and in 
higher skills than skill center courses, the average total cost 
rose to $5,173 including allowances, despite subsidized tu 
ition.
In Tucson, for example, a skill center and a private pro 
prietary school provided occupational training alternatives. 
The annual average cost per slot at the skill center was $3,324 
in 1980. However, costs per enrollee averaged $351 and costs 
per completer were $640, ranging from $95 per trainee 
receiving only adult basic education or job search training to 
$4,144 for a full year of skill training as a licensed practical 
nurse. Also, included in the mix were 2-week pre-OJT basic 
skill courses for electronic assemblers and an 8-week course 
for bank tellers. The private trade school charged a tuition of 
$5,200 for an academic year but, since CETA enrollees were 
automatically eligible for basic education opportunity 
grants, the cost to CETA was $2,000 per enrollee for the 
academic year. That private school advantage was lost in 
early 1981 when enrollees at the skill center became eligible 
for BEOG grants in consequence of the center becoming a 
unit of the community college. Because the private school 
was highly selective in its entrace requirements, the prime 
sponsor decided to put all its fiscal year 1981 classroom 
training funds into the skill center, whereupon the private 
school unsuccessfully sued. Where the classroom training 
program was accomplished primarily in public post- 
secondary vocational and technical training institutions, 
either through individual referral or in class-size groups (as 
in North Carolina), CETA pays only the heavily subsidized
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tuition any individual student would pay, thus shifting 
substantial costs to the state.
Indianapolis is an example of a program that has operated 
classroom training totally on an individual referral basis. 
One private college charged $1,690 per slot for tuition and 
books for two academic quarters, while a cosmetology 
school charged $1,890 for 1,500 hours of training over a 
9-month period. At one technical institution, the cost by oc 
cupation ranged from $1,500 to $1,800 per academic year, 
while another charged $4,283 for a 1,000 hour program, and 
a truck driving school charged $2,675 for 10 weeks. These 
costs did not include the allowances, which were paid direct 
ly to the enrollees.
Montgomery County relies primarily on class-size courses 
at private and public institutions. The Penobscot prime 
sponsor obtains basic education at no cost and occupational 
skill training at subsidized tuition rates at public institutions 
but pays full tuition costs, less BEOG's, at private institu 
tions. By carefully selecting its enrollees, Montgomery 
County negotiated $3,000 tuition costs for 26-week high- 
technology programs at a private university and a private 
technical school, while a CBO had been charging $4,000 for 
training in much lower-skill occupations. Occupational 
training at a community college was obtained for $1,000 per 
enrollee, while non-skill training consisting of English as a 
second language, basic education, and assertiveness training 
for women ranged from $800 to $1,800 per person.
In general, costs appeared in line with costs of occupa 
tional training outside CETA. Allowances were the major 
additions over the costs considered standard to training in 
stitutions. They were a necessity for many of the low-income 
clientele, but some of the non-family heads probably could 
have managed tuitionless training without stipends, had such 
allowances not come to be expected. However, Montgomery
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County had tried nonstipended training and had ended by 
serving non-family heads from households at the upper 
socioeconomic levels of CETA eligibility. Dallas had manag 
ed a compromise, paying stipends at an hourly rate that was 
an average of 80 cents below the federal minimum. A per 
suasive case can be made for changing the allowance struc 
ture to prevent those stipends becoming a major incentive 
for enrollment. A major cost for CETA has been the deci 
sion to set the training allowance at the minimum wage for 
the hours attended, plus add-ons for training expenses and 
dependents. Those training for low-skill occupations may ac 
tually have a higher take-home pay during enrollment than 
after placement, making many reluctant to leave the shelter 
of the program. Since total allowance costs are determined 
by duration of training, whereas training costs fluctuate to 
some extent by occupation and by institution, allowances 
vary from about 40 percent to about 60 percent of total 
training costs. Because length of training is the major deter 
minant of both training cost and occupational level, the 
highest-cost training tends to prepare enrollees for the best 
jobs.
3. Quality of Training
There are no simple criteria for measuring the quality of 
training; in fact, there is much mystique in the concept. Ef 
fectiveness might be conceptually easier to measure, but the 
data do not exist. Placement does not measure effectiveness 
unless compared against controls because the state of the 
local labor market may be the more critical determinant.
Many factors enter into an assessment of training quality: 
the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and curriculum; the 
competence of the instructors; the appropriateness of the 
training occupations; the adequacy of training duration; and 
the quality of the needed supportive services provided. The 
characteristics of the clients and the supportive services they 
require also affect the quality of training provided. The 
management of training, including the linkages among ser 
vices and with employers, may affect outcomes no less than 
the training itself. Of course, costs are both a determinant of 
quality and a yardstick against which to measure effec 
tiveness.
Institutional Capacity
Because of the limited resources available to them, the 
prime sponsors included in this study were dependent upon 
the quality of the training institutions in existence. They were 
in no position to create new ones. Prime sponsor staff could 
only demonstrate acumen in choosing between alternatives 
of higher and lower quality. The quality of the available in 
stitutions in rural Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, and 
Utah was generally good, and the prime sponsors utilized the
37
38
available resources. In some isolated areas of these states, 
however, there were no training institutions available. In 
those situations, the choices were to rely on work experience 
or on-the-job training (though potential host employers were 
also scarce) or to pay costs of transportation and lodging at a 
distant site. In each of these cases, at least some moneys were 
allocated to institutions of lesser quality for political 
reasons, to maintain a range of alternatives, or because of 
the particular attachments of institutions to race, sex, or 
other groupings among the eligible population.
The types of training institutions have been described but 
can also be ranked according to quality. The best institutions 
were those that were created to appeal to the broader, non- 
disadvantaged population in the community. Private pro 
prietary trade schools depended upon a combination of high- 
quality training and good placement rates to maintain a 
clientele and make a profit. Attractive facilities, up-to-date 
equipment, high-quality staff, sound and motivating cur 
ricula, and high placement rates were all necessary to con 
tinue to attract tuition-paying customers. However, this 
quality came at high cost to CETA, both in budget dollars 
and selectivity of enrollees.
Few CETA enrollees could meet the entry requirements of 
proprietary schools on an individual basis. Pressures from 
the Federal Trade Commission to advertise their placement 
rate make such schools reluctant to accept the hard-to-place. 
The Montgomery County experience of screening 1,100 
CETA eligible applicants to find 33 persons acceptable to a 
technical school for a biomedical technician program has 
been noted. On the other hand, the San Francisco experi 
ment with placing a class-size project in a private business 
school, where the instructional and administrative staff was 
never able to establish rapport, illustrates the difficulties for 
such a school in seeking to adapt itself to an unfamiliar 
clientele.
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There are, however, private institutions capable of serving 
a broader portion of the CETA population, as illustrated by 
the ABC Trade School in Tucson and the Beal and Hudson 
Colleges in Maine. For the CETA-eligible persons who can 
qualify, these appear to be good investments because they 
train for the mainstream labor market, their training lasts 
for longer periods of time, and they provide access to jobs 
that pay enough to assure economic independence. But selec 
tion must be made with care, and the prime sponsor should 
maintain a liaison with and access to external supportive ser 
vices to increase the chances of enrollee survival.
Community colleges, technical colleges, and area voca 
tional schools rank next in quality. In recent years these in 
stitutions have experienced a vast expansion and qualitative 
upgrading. The facilities and equipment are generally of high 
quality, and the occupational offerings tend to be broader 
than at the proprietary schools. Some CETA prime sponsors 
may be overly attracted to such institutions because of the 
comparatively low cost. Most CETA enrollees can gain en 
trance, but the challenge is to survive. The institutions have 
adapted to the needs of the average high school graduate. 
They rarely have available remedial adult basic education, 
English as a second language, close counseling support, and 
other supportive services likely to be needed by the CETA 
population. CETA referrals who can survive in that setting 
are likely to be brought into contact with the primary labor 
market. Most such schools have informal and formal 
employer contacts. The enrollee emerges from a mainstream 
institution rather than from a stigmatized federal program. 
The enrollee may well be inspired to a higher self-image as 
well.
As the case studies illustrate, some of the survival prob 
lems for CETA enrollees in these mainstream institutions 
can be minimized by the prime sponsor staff working closely
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with the training institutions. The options are to persuade 
the institution to mount its own supportive services ac 
tivities, allow the stationing of agency personnel at the train 
ing institution to provide the social services, or arrange to 
provide access to supportive services external to the training 
institution. North Carolina has attacked the problem with its 
8-week human resource development program, given prior 
to enrollment in occupational skill training.
The third institutional tier appears to be the skill centers. 
They are typically designed around an open entry-open exit 
concept in which an enrollee can enter regardless of 
background, obtain remedial education and advocacy 
counseling, enter individualized training without waiting, 
progress through a modularized course sequence, and seek 
employment upon attainment of a skill. They may also leave 
when they have reached their learning capacity or upon 
becoming financially pressed. All the necessary remedial and 
supportive services, including placement services, were 
designed to be available onsite from skill center staff or 
outstationed staff of other agencies. The survival chances of 
the less-qualified CETA eligibles are enhanced in the skill 
center environment. However, the facilities suffer in quality 
and tend to be limited to occupations in which entry for a 
disadvantaged person can be attained in 6 months or less of 
training.
The training provided by community-based organizations 
offers the fourth tier in quality. As usual, there are excep 
tions. As noted above, the Seattle OIC occupies modern 
training facilities and provides superior training. That is a 
unique case, however. CBOs generally operate out of 
haphazard facilities, just as skill centers do, and, although 
high quality training can occur in a substandard facility, 
there is at least an image handicap. The comparative advan 
tage of a CBO is racial and ethnic identity. The few CBOs 
that offer occupational training tend to depend upon the
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charisma and commitment of staff, but the overall perfor 
mance is spotty.
Contracting with CBOs for CETA services involves more 
than straightforward judgments of training quality. Aside 
from political considerations, which may be controlling, 
CBO personnel can provide the enrollees with a sense of 
identity and can offer the program greater visibility in the 
community. In some localities this may be sufficient reason 
for funding groups that mix training with a good dose of ad 
vocacy. In general, the messages of these case studies suggest 
that it is best to leave to CBOs the primary functions of 
outreach and intake, remedial components, and affirmative 
action sponsorship on behalf of their particular clientele. 
Since these activities are generally new to everyone in the 
community, a CBO can mount them as effectively as any 
other available institution. Also, the CBOs are more likely to 
be aware of the needs of the eligible population, and they 
have greater flexibility than the educational institutions. Oc 
cupational training is, however, at its best when assigned to 
schools or employer settings with satisfactory facilities and 
recognized competence.
The case studies demonstrate that the paucity of funds for 
facilities and equipment is a distinct obstacle to CETA train 
ing. The institution acting as contractor to provide training 
normally furnishes its own facilities and equipment. DOL 
pressures are against providing sufficient funding to upgrade 
facilities and equipment, and prime sponsors are reluctant to 
use scarce funds for these purposes. Private schools, of 
course, charge enough for their training to cover amortiza 
tion. Public educational institutions provide a substantial 
subsidy to CETA through free use of facilities and equip 
ment as well as through tuition charges that are well below 
costs. Skill centers and CBOs must negotiate with prime 
sponsors for sufficient funds to improve their facilities and
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upgrade their equipment but have had to overcome prime 
sponsors' resistance to cost increases.
As noted, prime sponsors lack the resources to provide 
training in areas where no effective training institution ex 
ists. The differences were critical in two of the three 
Penobscot consortium counties, in some of Utah's isolated 
areas, and in Ottawa County. The choice left to the prime 
sponsor in these areas was to make do with the available in 
stitutions, limit the program to work experience, or train ap 
plicants at some far-away institution involving travel ex 
penses and living costs.
Curricula and Staff
The quality of occupational skill training curricula ap 
peared to be generally good, though each institution was be 
ing forced to adapt materials prepared for the mainstream. 
A system of sharing curriculum within CETA training circles 
would have been of considerable value.
Curricula for remedial adult basic education are now 
reasonably well developed and available "off the shelf" 
from several commercial publishers and educational 
systems. English as a second language is approaching that 
status with an informal network of exchange among practi 
tioners. Fortunately, a separate curriculum does not seem 
necessary for each language. San Francisco, where all ESL 
instructors share community college certification, has its 
own multilingual informal interchange, while ELS materials 
for Spanish-speaking trainees have been circulating since 
MDTA began. Vocational English as a second language 
(VESL) seems to be the code term for this growing multi 
lingual interchange. San Francisco, Seattle, and Tucson of 
fered the best training noted in this field, although no case 
study author identified ESL as an area of curriculum 
weakness. The anxiety of the immigrant enrollees for pro-
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gress and the ethnic identification of the instructors are un 
doubtedly positive qualitative factors.
In contrast, limited curriculum material seems to have 
been designed for orientation, motivation, and various cop 
ing skills such as grooming, personal finance, and how to 
gain access to public services. The goals of orientation are 
not clear nor do we know how to motivate employees, as the 
experience of high-priced consultants to industry clearly il 
lustrates. Job search training is too new to have developed a 
widely acceptable curriculum. Most of the literature in the 
field, developed in support of career choice and access to 
professional jobs by college graduates and displaced ex 
ecutives, has limited relevance to a CETA-eligible popula 
tion. Consulting firms have begun to compete vigorously for 
assignments from CETA prime sponsors, but many 
unresolved methodological and conceptual issues concerning 
curriculum approaches remain. Quality at this point is likely 
to rest more with the charisma and good sense of the 
workshop leader than with curriculum content.
Staff development seemed to be a serious problem in the 
CETA training system. For institutions outside the training 
mainstream, including skill centers, there is ordinarily no re 
quirement for preservice teacher training and no linkage to 
ongoing inservice teacher training and staff development 
systems. There are no funds or provisions in CETA contracts 
for upgrading contractor personnel. There is none of the 
leisurely pace of public education. Instructors are paid by 
classroom hour and have no built-in incentives for self- 
development. The generally high quality of instruction must 
be attributed to personal dedication rather than to institu 
tional incentives. Formal staff development ought to make it 
even better. North Carolina went furthest of the 12 case 
studies in attempting to meet that need but the full potential 
effectiveness of its state-financed Employment and Training 
Institute was thwarted by political infighting. Still, it is a
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model worth consideration, since it is close enough to the 
local level to allow general staff attendance and onsite 
assistance, yet has a large enough scope for economies of 
scale.
Occupational and O JT Quality
The training occupations available to CETA enrollees are 
limited by the policy of keeping per-capita costs low and, 
therefore, training of short duration. The average classroom 
course length is 5.5 months, although the law permits pro 
grams of up to 2 years. Nonetheless, all of the prime spon 
sors indicated the imposition by regional officials of more 
stringent de facto limitations, which prime sponsors tend to 
enforce in response to pressures for maximum enrollments. 
In effect, therefore, CETA training is limited to 1-year pro 
grams even though some prime sponsors, notably 
Penobscot, enrolled their participants in 2-year programs, 
with the understanding that they had to pay their own way 
the second year. The availability of basic education oppor 
tunity grants facilitated this approach, and the grants were 
used extensively in several locations to reduce the cost of the 
initial support. Enrollment of 1 academic year or less in a 
low-tuition occupational program in a public institution 
seemed to be generally available for those meeting both 
CETA eligibility and the institution's entry requirements, 
but the number who could qualify was limited, except in San 
Francisco, Seattle, and Utah—areas with a generally high 
average level of education—which generated waiting lists of 
qualified applicants.
Occasionally prime sponsors attempt to generate class-size 
CETA projects within mainstream training institutions. Ex 
amples include Montgomery County's biomedical technician 
program, electronic technician, computer operation and pro 
gramming courses in North Carolina, Penobscot, Worcester,
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Baltimore, and Dallas. Most of these advanced projects were 
funded under the skill training improvement program, which 
had its own separate, more-generous funding and less- 
restrictive eligibility standards than the run-of-the-mill 
CETA training.
The skill center programs offer occasional departures 
from the standard meager menu because of the special and 
temporary employer need, but the pressures for short train 
ing time, low costs, and immediate placement create a cen 
tripetal force back to the basic grouping. Tucson's elec 
tromechanical assembly and bank teller programs, air condi 
tioning installation courses in Dallas, and Seattle's addition 
of maritime trades to the skill center's offerings are examples 
of efforts to meet special local needs. The difficulties of 
recruiting and retaining a sufficient number of eligible 
enrollees qualified for the training outside of the customary 
clerical, health, automotive, welding, machine operations 
and food and building service are illustrated by the class-size 
computer programming and operation courses in Baltimore 
and at the Dallas QIC.
Little is known about the quality of on-the-job training. 
CETA prime sponsors are usually one additional step remov 
ed from OJT employers. As noted, the prime sponsor con 
tracts with a CBO, the local public job service, or the Na 
tional Alliance of Business chapter to contact employers and 
place CETA-eligible enrollees with them. Some subcontrac 
tors make periodic visits to employers and some do not, and 
prime sponsor staff also make spot checks. But the staff 
making these checks are not training experts. OJT can range 
from formal inplant courses to working under the watchful 
eye of a supervisor or being assisted by a fellow employee. 
The first issue is, did the employer hire a CETA-eligible per 
son because of the training subsidy rather than an employee 
not eligible under CETA who would otherwise have gotten 
the job? The payoff is whether the enrollee is retained in an
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unsubsidized job. The fact that such retention occurs in most 
cases undoubtedly explains the highly attractive benefit-cost 
ratio documented in the national review.
Supportive services are an essential ingredient of CETA 
training that affects its quality. MDTA pioneered in the 
development of client assistance—child care and transporta 
tion—to ease participation in occupational skill training. 
CETA continued to provide these services, although other 
programs have shared in the responsibility for their funding. 
Even more than MDTA, CETA has emphasized acquiring 
the personal attributes of employability, whether or not the 
client participates in occupational training.
Counseling remains a supportive service whose value is 
taken on faith in the absence of any strong evidence about 
the extent to which it makes a difference in participant out 
comes. The same applies to training for job search, which is 
a more recent development without an articulated common 
curriculum and to orientation and motivation activities, 
which are too diverse and amorphous to make assessment of 
these approaches any more than a matter of faith.
Need for transportation assistance was significant only in 
Dallas and Penobscot. Most child-care facilities and services 
were provided by non-CETA agencies and did not appear to 
be a serious problem to prime sponsors. In general, the non- 
training supportive services have been taken over by other in 
stitutions during the past decade, while the nonoccupational 
labor market skills such as job search have exceeded them in 
importance within the CETA program.
Linkages and Sequence
A significant consideration in assessing the quality of a 
CETA training program might be the degree to which it is 
linked with other CETA components, with programs in
47
mainstream education institutions, and with employing 
organizations. The scarcity of such linkages was one of the 
disappointing findings of the study. An advantage of decen 
tralized administration should be the ability of the prime 
sponsor to orchestrate passage of the eligible enrollee 
through a sequence of locally available services, starting 
from the enrollee's initial need and completing with having 
attained employability and a job. Such sequencing was rare, 
however. Only three of the 12 prime sponsors centralized 
their total intake, and two others did so for part of their 
clientele. The norm was for a service deliverer to be responsi 
ble for its own recruitment, selection, and assessment of 
clients whose access was limited to the services provided by 
that contractor. The general tendency was to make one pro 
gram referral per enrollee and provide nothing further, ex 
cept perhaps placement services after completion.
There is no legal or regulatory obstacle to starting an in 
dividual in ESL and adult basic education at one institution, 
moving to skill training at another, followed perhaps by an 
on-the-job training stint and job search training from 
another institution, as needed. The obstacles are conceptual, 
logistical, and financial. Prime sponsor staff generally lack 
interest in and capability to design comprehensive delivery 
systems, to chart client flows, and to generate realistic and 
meaningful employability development plans. A systematic 
client tracking system is necessary to monitor the enrollee's 
progress, and it is difficult to assign accountability and 
measure contractor performance in an interdependent 
system. Reporting requirements further discourage mixing 
components. The financial drawback is the amount of 
money to be spent per individual. The longer amount of time 
necessary to traverse the complex programmatic terrain in 
creases the amount spent for allowances.
The standard practice of the prime sponsors studied was to 
provide no employment and training services directly. Only
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the skill centers and the North Carolina community colleges 
and technical institutions provided both nonoccupational 
and occupational training within the same training institu 
tion. Most other institutions performed only one or a limited 
range of services. Absent centralized intake centers, there 
were no means of arranging a needed sequence of services to 
be supplied in turn by service deliverers. Each contractor had 
every incentive to keep its applicants inhouse and little or no 
incentive to refer them to other institutions for alternative or 
supplemental services. But centralized intake is not enough. 
There must be some means of assessment to determine 
enrollee capability and need.
There were some exceptions to these generalizations about 
sequencing and relations with the education community. 
Penobscot operated its own intake and assessment centers 
and tried to develop a realistic employability development 
plan for each participant. It was able to determine who need 
ed adult basic education, refer them to that service, and then 
on to occupational skill training when the desired level had 
been achieved. Through the assessment process, only those 
with good work habits were referred to OJT. PSE was 
visualized as being OJT in the public sector with persons 
referred there first to learn and practice skills and then to be 
referred to either classroom training or private sector OJT. 
Penobscot was the only prime sponsor studied that seemed 
to be able to use the employability development plan as an 
instrument for sequencing individuals through multiprogram 
involvement.
Despite operating its own intake centers, there was little 
attempt in Baltimore to provide sequential services beyond 
the first referral. Dallas had contracted with a CBO for a 
centralized intake and assessment center but there was no 
continuing linkage between that center and the organizations 
to which the individuals were referred and no arrangement 
for later sequential referrals. The Washington state employ-
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ment service operated a well-staffed assessment center to 
recommend choices among OJT, individual referral, the skill 
center, and occupations within them. Tucson had con 
siderable movement of individuals from adult basic educa 
tion and ESL and other nonoccupational activities at CBOs 
into occupational training at the skill center. This was ac 
complished by allocating a fixed number of slots at the skill 
center to each CBO that assumed the responsibility for 
allowance payments and placement efforts on behalf of 
those individuals. The skill center then provided vocational 
assessment to help in the choice of training occupation. 
Beyond these examples, assignments were based upon 
availability of openings or enrollee choice.
Except in Seattle, all skill centers studied were units of the 
public education systems. Yet the latter invariably treated 
their skill centers as stepchildren and established few, if any, 
linkages.
Tucson and Baltimore seemed to have the most significant 
linkages with the employer community. In Tucson, a joint 
and overlapping economic development council, prime spon 
sor advisory council, and private industry council was a 
useful device for program planning and for development of 
linked classroom and O JT programs but not for direct place 
ment. Baltimore, more than the other sponsors, seemed to 
have worked out effective continuing program planning and 
marketing relationships for direct placement with 
cooperating employers.
By and large, CETA appeared to be a mechanism for plac 
ing resources into the hands of training institutions and 
channeling eligible individuals into training programs. 
However, with the possible exception of Penobscot and to a 
lesser degree Tucson, nowhere did any of the 12 prime spon 
sors studied develop the institutional arrangements that are 
necessary for a sequential training system.
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The Quality of Evaluation
The 12 case studies indicate that federal administrators 
displayed little concern about training quality and few prime 
sponsors appeared to have staffs qualified to assess the 
quality of training offered and to recommend improvements 
in it. The only prime sponsor staff with a continuing assign 
ment for direct onsite observation are the program monitors, 
but theirs is an entry level position characterized by high 
turnover—either up or out—which prevents the accumula 
tion of experiences upon which to make valid judgments. 
Training quality appeared to be more often an accident of in 
stitutional availability. Fortunately, the accident happened 
more often than not, so that one can report favorably on the 
general quality level of CETA training, including the 
facilities, equipment, curricula, and staff.
But what about the results? Regrettably, the information 
does not exist to measure accomplishment at the local level. 
Not one of the prime sponsors studied could produce reliable 
and comprehensive statistics proving the long-run results of 
their training efforts. All maintained placement and positive 
termination rates and pre-entry/postparticipation wage rates 
because those were required by the DOL reporting system. A 
few maintained followup data for up to 6 months after train 
ing, but most did little f ollowup. Baltimore had the most ex 
tensive evaluation program of the 12, with a separate office 
of program evaluation and research to carry it out. Rather 
than evaluate on a contract-by-contract basis, the evalua 
tions were structured around service components in order to 
ascertain which are most effective for whom. However, the 
evaluation effort necessarily relied upon measures of short- 
run rather than long-run gains. Dallas is an example of a 
prime sponsor which contracts for 3-, 6-, and 12-month 
followup, but obtains no information on program impact. 
The purpose is to assess contractor performance but not to
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test the worth or outcomes of the program. Penobscot 
follows up its enrollees but does not record results separately 
for each service component.
Completion rates were generally reported by the prime 
sponsors to be in the 80 and 90 percentiles, a remarkably 
high achievement if the data are correct. Placement rates 
typically were reported to range from 65 to 85 percent, but 
was the determining factor the quality of the training pro 
gram, the state of the local economy, or the competence of 
the job development and placement functions?
No prime sponsor had conducted any controlled study to 
determine how the gains to the participants fared compared 
with those experienced by a like group of nonparticipants. 
Only San Francisco had attempted to calculate cost-benefit 
ratios to be used as a management tool for the allocation of 
funds among contractors and services. Participant costs were 
compared to the annualized first postenrollment placement 
wage. In some of the ESL programs particularly the gains 
were spectacular, but hardly surprising considering, for ex 
ample, a Cambodian pre-entry wage compared with a San 
Francisco post-participation wage. Since the ESL placement 
rates were consistently over 80 percent and retention rates 
even higher 6 months later, there is no reason to doubt the 
positive thrust of the findings.
Even excluding the unique San Francisco situation, the 
average wage gains were significant, considering that many 
participants had to settle for jobs in secondary labor 
markets. The boosts in average hourly rates from $3.36 to 
$3.97 in Dallas and from $3.60 to $4.25 in Baltimore are 
typical examples.
The natural concern of a prime sponsor is the relative ef 
fectiveness of service alternatives—does classrom training, 
on-the-job training, work experience, or some other alter 
native service provide the most placement per dollar of ex-
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penditure? Whether the unserved did as well as the served 
was a question which they felt no obligation to answer. In 
volved as they are in day-to-day operations, prime sponsors 
do not place high priority on determining whether the 
benefits from CETA services exceed the costs of those ser 
vices. Process evaluation of the CETA system is con 
siderable, perhaps too much so. Outcomes evaluation at the 
local level is rare and the national system, though thorough, 
involves long-term lags. Because they were limited to im 
mediate placement data, prime sponsors are often led into 
less than cost-effective strategies. Work experience and 
short-duration training produce equal immediate placement 
rates at lower costs in comparison with longer-duration 
training, which is nonetheless shown by the national 
longitudinal data to have the greater ultimate payoff.
4. The Management of Training
The CETA system involves a partnership of federal, state, 
and local governments, with advice from other labor market 
participants, for the delivery of services designed to improve 
the employment and training experiences of eligible 
unemployed and economically disadvantaged persons. While 
this study focuses on training, it is necessary to assess how 
training fares in this milieu. Understanding and appraising 
the system in which training decisions are made requires an 
examination of the decisionmaking process.
The Decisionmakers
The CETA decisionmaking process involves elected of 
ficials, prime sponsor staff, advisory bodies, contractors and 
subcontractors, client groups, and the public at the local 
level, all interacting with state officials and agencies, federal 
Department of Labor officials, and, ultimately, the Con 
gress. Each has varying impact on the nature and quality of 
the training delivered, but not necessarily on the outcomes.
Elected Officials
Few elected officials were deeply involved in the dozen 
cases under scrutiny. Some ignored CETA's existence. Some 
asked for periodic briefings to assure that no unforeseen 
political dangers were lurking within CETA's complexities. 
Only one, the mayor of Baltimore, perceived CETA as play 
ing any significant role in his plans for his jurisdiction and 
administration. For him, CETA was a key resource for ser 
vices to his constituents, a welcome linkage between social
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services and economic development activities, and its direc 
tor was a valued lieutenant in his administration.
Most chief elected officials were satisfied to leave the 
management of the prime sponsorship to the staff, provided 
that CETA operations did not cause political embarrass 
ment. In the two cases where the governors were the chief 
elected officials, their role was even less than that of mayors 
and county officials. Since decisionmaking was largely 
decentralized to associations of government in North 
Carolina and Utah, the systems may simply have been too 
amorphous for the governors to have means for participa 
tion. In Utah, the previous governor had resolved to shift 
from intense personal involvement to extreme decentraliza 
tion, and the incumbent governor had not reversed that 
trend. In North Carolina, CETA has often been a political 
issue, but no governor has been much concerned with its 
substance. Two-thirds of the North Carolina county com 
missioners involved would have preferred the abolition of 
CETA, which seemed also to be the preference of the Dallas 
city council.
The finding that the elected official's involvement is not 
crucial to effective CETA administration does not mean that 
the role does not exist. Elected officials were interested and 
evident where political sensitivities were at stake. They occa 
sionally overruled their directors after counting political 
costs. That meant, however, that their interest level was like 
ly to be high in relation to public service employment and 
low in relation to training.
The Staff Directors
The key decisionmaker in a local CETA system is the 
prime sponsor staff director. This official is most often the 
prime determinant in deciding how the local prime sponsor 
ship will respond to the local political, economic, and
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demographic conditions in the usage of CETA funds. From 
the 12 case studies, it is possible to derive a profile of the ef 
fective staff director. Yet there is no evidence linking that 
profile with outcomes of the program, as measured by 
employment and income gains of participants. Of the 12 
prime sponsors, four stood out as the most effective leaders, 
whereas two others were so new that there was inadequate 
evidence of their eventual effectiveness. What marked the 
leadership effectiveness of these four was their ability to con 
ceptualize the CETA system for their locality, derive a set of 
objectives consistent with the local economic and political 
mix, design a realistic program consistent with those objec 
tives, and then direct the human and financial resources of 
the prime sponsorship toward the achievement of those 
directives. The conceptualization might not be that which 
was in the minds of CETA congressional authors, and the 
objectives might not be those espoused by the national and 
regional offices. However, survival demands objectives and 
approaches that are realistic and desirable within the local 
context.
Considering the long-run interests of the CETA-eligible 
population, an effective program is one in which (1) ap 
propriate priorities are made for specified reasons among 
those eligible for service; (2) the barriers impeding the 
employment of individuals in the target groups are identified 
as clearly as available data make possible; (3) a mix of ser 
vices is explicitly selected which takes into account the needs 
of the target group, the capabilities of potential service 
deliverers, and the realities of the labor market; (4) service 
deliverers are chosen on the basis of their ability to deliver 
quality service; and, (5) the outcomes are as favorable as the 
state of the labor market and the nature of the employment 
barriers allow. The staff director must be sensitive to outside 
pressures and constructively accommodate the prime spon 
sor's objectives with the mix of political interests dominant
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on the local and national scene. Effectiveness in each situa 
tion must be judged in relation to alternatives that the prime 
sponsor might have adopted. Cross-prime-sponsor com 
parisons are of limited value because of the widely varying 
circumstances.
Baltimore, San Francisco, Penobscot County, and Tucson 
are examples of prime sponsors operating under strong and 
effective leadership. Sex certainly was not the determining 
factor. Two of the four more-effective leaders were women 
and two were men. All four have a clear vision of what they 
believe CETA objectives to be, how much can be ac 
complished within their political, economic, and budgetary 
constraints, and are aggressive in pursuing their aims.
The stability or the strength of the political leadership does 
not create the staff leadership. Only Baltimore of the four 
cited prime sponsors could claim an elected chief executive 
concerned enough with the employment and training arena 
to contribute to the creation of a leader in his own image. 
The San Francisco staff director had served under three 
mayors, none of whom were especially enamored of CETA 
or deeply involved with it. The Penobscot director served 
under a corporate leadership of nine county commissioners, 
none of whom loaned substantial strength to the CETA 
operation. One Tucson mayor spanned the entire CETA ex 
perience, supported his staff director, but did not involve 
himself in CETA affairs. Except in Baltimore, the chief 
elected official never added to or subtracted from the effec 
tiveness of the staff director. The Baltimore staff director 
could undoubtedly carry the load by herself but has been aid 
ed by the strengths of her mayor.
On the other hand, political leaders established a climate 
in North Carolina and Dallas, Texas in which no strong 
leader could have or would have persisted. Eight successive 
directors served the former, usually until abruptly removed.
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The pattern of the latter was to view the role as a temporary 
assignment to be moved beyond as soon as possible. In other 
cases, the political environment was essentially neutral.
Leadership can drag a program down as well as build it 
up. Both the Utah and Seattle prime sponsors began under 
nationally recognized leadership and their programs were 
considered among the best in the nation. The original Utah 
leadership left when the governor backed away from support 
of a strongly centralized state program. The Seattle director 
left because he felt the Congress and the incoming ad 
ministration in 1977 was unduly restricting local autonomy. 
He has not been replaced by leaders of equal stature as the 
Seattle program subsided into mediocrity.
Concern has been expressed about the staff director's 
stability of tenure. However, these case studies should be 
reassuring. No strong and effective staff director was replac 
ed as a result of a lost election, though some were removed in 
internal political squabbles. On the other hand, those with 
effective leadership in the small group of cases have never ex 
perienced a change of political party in an election or have 
been protected by a consortium structure in which all of the 
principals did not change simultaneously.
Academic credentials appear to be irrelevant and ex 
perience seems to be paramount. All four of the most im 
pressive leaders preceded CETA passage in their manpower 
program involvement. Typically, the less-effective leaders 
were more recent entrants, leaving one to wonder whether 
experience built strength or only the strong survived.
Salary and job security are not the explanation of strong 
leadership, though they may often encourage its absence. 
CETA directors and staff seem more responsive to challenge 
than to salary. But why would an effective leader accept the 
CETA assignment? The rewards are totally in a sense of ser 
vice. CETA salaries are usually no more than and often less
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than those for comparable jobs in state and local govern 
ments. Why would persons give up other alternatives to 
function in the unstable and uncertain world of CETA? The 
motivations appear primarily intrinsic and often seem to in 
volve a commitment to improve social conditions and con 
tribute to the alleviation of unemployment, poverty, and 
discrimination. The answer may have to come from a 
psychiatrist, but even in these cynical times dedicated people 
can still be found.
That leaves a conundrum: How can a program attract 
strong leadership? Must it remain a happy accident? The 
search must be for independent spirits with sound ad 
ministrative skills. They will always be scarce but not nonex 
istent. Ultimately, for a system to survive, the extrinsic 
motivations must be strengthened to support the intrinsic 
ones.
Staff
Conventional wisdom has it that one of CETA's major 
problems is the high turnover of prime sponsor staff. The 12 
case studies do not support that generalization. Of the 12, all 
but two, Dallas and North Carolina, had in fact experienced 
remarkable stability, considering the limited access to the 
customary devices for job security. In fact, the Dallas CETA 
staff were city merit-system employees and that seemed to 
contribute to, rather than minimize, turnover. Two prime 
sponsors, Montgomery County and Seattle, had each ex 
perienced a substantial one-time turnover consequent to 
changes in directors but had experienced staff stability 
before and after. Utah experienced a major turnover in the 
leadership of its pioneering state manpower planning effort, 
but that was on the eve of CETA passage and stability had 
prevailed since. All of the others had experienced continued 
stability in all of the key management and technical levels. 
Turnover of lower-level and nonpolicy staff occurred but did
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not significantly affect policy or operation. Possibly one ma 
jor contribution to staff stability has been the fact that over 
the first 6 years, CETA was a growth industry and able staff 
members had ample opportunity for upward mobility within 
the system.
Dallas reflected a hostile political environment where 
political leaders apparently wished that CETA went away, 
and at least on one occasion the city council narrowly 
defeated a proposal to refuse CETA funds. A CETA assign 
ment was just another job to staff who expected to be pro 
moted and transferred soon, and many were. There was no 
noticeable commitment to the CETA mission. North 
Carolina has suffered from fluctuating political perceptions 
of what CETA could and should be and failure of anyone to 
visualize a consistent and viable mission for the sprawling 
balance-of-state structure. Yet the high turnover was limited 
to the director with the staff experiencing no higher turnover 
than typical in state and local government.
On the other hand, stability existed in situations with and 
without merit-system protection, with low pay and high. 
Two situations seemed to contribute to staff stability: (1) ef 
fective staff directors and an organizational sense of mis 
sion—being part of an effective and committed organization 
was apparently attractive enough; and, (2) an abundant sup 
ply of the college-educated who depended upon CETA for 
scarce job opportunities. Utah and Ottawa County were ex 
amples. The living environment was attractive and there 
were few alternatives for college-educated people without 
technical and professional skills. That does not mean these 
staffs lacked competence. They were able people but without 
a notable sense of mission. Dependence of staff stability on 
leadership strength and agency commitment is in some ways 
a disappointing, though not surprising, finding. Putting in 
place higher salaries, job security, or a training program for 
staff development is much easier than finding and develop-
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ing competent leaders or generating from the top down a 
sense of mission.
Not turnover but accretion had been the staffing problem 
of the 12 prime sponsors. All the prime sponsors report rapid 
increases in staff following the passage of the Youth 
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act in 1977; it was 
not unusual for the prime sponsor staffs to increase fivefold 
or more within several months of enactment.
Advisory Councils
The case studies were reassuring as to the role and con 
tribution of the advisory councils mandated by CETA law, 
again in contrast to what has been reported from other 
CETA studies. In about half of the prime sponsors studied, 
staff followed the advice of the advisory councils on most 
issues. In fact, a council vote was considered the final word 
by several prime sponsor staffs. The conditions that divided 
the prime sponsors into two groups on this issue are instruc 
tive. The effective leaders seemed to put the greatest respon 
sibilities on their advisory councils, and advisory councils 
seemed to respond when they had decisionmaking power.
Councils did not generally work well where the CETA 
operations were spread beyond the local community lines, as 
in Ottawa County, North Carolina, and Utah. However, the 
Penobscot staff director had been able to develop a useful 
council role by having three councils, one for each county in 
the consortium, and some of the separate advisory councils 
to substate planning regions have worked effectively in 
North Carolina. Advisory councils also did little where their 
function was not considered important by the chief elected 
official and staff, or where their advice was ignored, or 
where little of significance was happening under CETA.
Council subcommittees were active in recommending the 
relative priority to be given to the various target groups and
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in reviewing and ranking program proposals, but had no 
means for judging quality by other than gross outcomes. 
They supplied a buffer for the staff in a politically sensitive 
function. They tended to show sound judgment and firmness 
in choosing and rewarding contractors and programs 
capable of demonstrated effectiveness, as measured by costs, 
placements, and other outcomes. They were not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to judge the quality of program content and 
conduct.
By design, the case studies paid little attention to youth 
programs and the youth advisory councils established by the 
1977 law. In general, it appears that these councils had not 
found a meaningful role, Private industry councils had a 
more programmatic than advisory role, but were relatively 
new when the case studies were prepared. A problem was the 
lack of rationale for three councils per prime sponsor. The 
Tucson model, which effectively combined the prime spon 
sor advisory council and the private industry council with the 
local economic development advisory council, seemed to 
have the most to offer.
A persisting controversy in CETA has been whether 
representatives of service delivery agencies should be allowed 
to serve on advisory councils, which make recommendations 
concerning choice among service delivery agencies. This con 
troversy involves particularly the job service and 
community-based organizations. To avoid conflict of in 
terest, federal regulations forbid representatives of organiza 
tions that deliver services to vote on decisions affecting their 
own funding, but membership on advisory councils is not 
forbidden. Most of the prime sponsors studied had taken 
steps to limit the proportion of service deliverers among ad 
visory council membership, and at least one relegated them 
to nonvoting status. However, the restriction did not prevent 
the representatives of service deliverers, particularly private 
contractors, to affect decisions by lobbying council members
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and elected officials. The job service and the public educa 
tion officials were sometimes not sufficiently interested to 
pursue a role aggressively, or in other cases appeared to con 
sider such pursuit demeaning.
In general, private service deliverers, by aggressive lobby 
ing, were able to preserve roles for themselves as long as they 
were at least moderately effective in performing their respon 
sibilities. Eventually, all the prime sponsors in the cases 
studied tended to "bite the bullet" and dumped clearly inef 
fective contractors, despite political pressure. Marginal con 
tractors, however, were often continued rather than do 
political battle over debatable issues.
The Feds
The prime sponsor perception of the federal role in CETA 
ranged from highly to mildly negative. Few favorable com 
ments were heard concerning any federal decision. That 
many of the decisions complained about were products of 
congressional action, not the U.S. Department of Labor, did 
not appear to be recognized by many at the prime sponsor 
level. However, it appeared to be universal judgment that the 
department's regulation writers tended to compound con 
gressional restrictions. The national office was perceived as 
having no concept of the impact of its administrative deci 
sions at the service delivery level. Meddling threats—rarely 
carried out, but disruptive of operations—rather than 
technical assistance appeared to the prime sponsors to be the 
preferred remedy for any apparent transgression.
Judgments as to national office competence and intentions 
were no less harsh in Labor Department regional offices than 
in the offices of the prime sponsors: "They don't know what 
they want or what life is like outside of Washington." A par 
ticular complaint of regional staff and a source of derision 
from prime sponsor staff was that any subscriber of the na-
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tional reporting services knew of Washington decisions days 
to weeks before the word reached officially the regional of 
fices, and the latter could not (or would not) take action until 
informed through formal channels. Then, higher regional 
levels were perceived as compounding the delay by rewriting 
the national directives into regional directives before sending 
them on to the field, often, it was claimed, distorting the 
meaning and compounding the confusion in the process.
One must interpret such complaints with care. It is to be 
expected that subordinate agencies and staff will complain 
about those who set the rules and hold the purse strings. It is 
also to be expected that national oversight agencies will con 
sider the subordinate as insubordinate and incompetent, 
especially to the extent those who oversee have more respon 
sibility than authority. Nevertheless, there does appear to be 
a real problem in contrast with the past. In pre-CETA days, 
a substantial number of federal operatives at regional and 
national levels had "come up" through the federal-state 
employment service and through state vocational education 
agencies, which were also the major providers of federally 
mandated services. No important national office positions 
are currently held by former members of prime sponsor 
staffs. The same is true, by and large, at the regional level, 
though a few are beginning to emerge at the lower levels 
there. Thus, the federal staff is responsible for functions 
they have never performed and that are foreign to their ex 
periences. When the alternatives are remedial technical 
assistance or threats, they are incapable of offering the 
former and resort to the latter.
For the prime sponsor, the visible test of federal com 
petence is the regional office field representative—in CETA 
parlance the "fed rep." This individual, who is expected to 
provide onsite supervision and technical assistance is at the 
bottom of the regional office hierarchy, rarely has any 
previous relevant experience, and is given little helpful train-
64
ing. In the 12 case studies, only one "fed rep" gained 
praise—from the North Carolina observer—as a consistently 
positive influence on the prime sponsor. Two other prime 
sponsors felt encouraged that after a long series of bad ex 
periences, new fed reps appeared more helpful than those of 
the past. Significantly, in one of the latter cases, the federal 
representative had come to that post after several years with 
a competent prime sponsor. Otherwise, the strongest praise 
was "he doesn't bother us very much."
After North Carolina, the most sanguine of the prime 
sponsors in their attitudes toward the fed reps and the 
regional offices were the Baltimore, San Francisco, and Utah 
prime sponsor directors. The first two both had the security 
on the local scene and the reputation nationally to feel in 
vulnerable to regional criticism. Both also were sufficiently 
close to the national scene to realize that Congress and the 
Washington officialdom were the source of unwise decisions 
rather than the regional staff. In Utah, the state CETA of 
fice shielded the associations of government, responsible for 
program operations, from direct federal contact.
Just where the balance of truth lies in the federal-local and 
national-regional relationship may be difficult to ascertain, 
but the relationship is clearly not a productive one. The 
Dallas case study provides a summary of intergovernmental 
relations that characterizes well the frustrations of the cur 
rent situation.
A study made from the prime-sponsor and national-office 
levels can provide little insight into the congressional deci- 
sionmaking process. However, it may be useful to contrast 
apparent congressional perceptions of the local decision- 
makers with those gained by knowledgeable observers mak 
ing indepth studies. Common complaints against Congress 
included: (1) overloading the system with too much public 
service employment too fast before the prime sponsor system
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was securely in place; (2) adding to that overload a continu 
ing stream of complex new programs; (3) compounding pro 
gram complexity by the detailed 1978 legislative re 
quirements; and, (4) being invariably late with its appropria 
tions.
The latter presents a serious obstacle to businesslike opera 
tions. A prime sponsor must plan for a year's service delivery 
without ever knowing within even a reasonable range what 
the funding levels will be. To have contracts in place by Oc 
tober 1, the start of the federal fiscal year, a prime sponsor 
must begin the planning process by January or February. 
The Labor Department promises budget estimates and na 
tional policy constraints by May 15 but almost never delivers 
on that promise. When the funding estimates arrive, they are 
no better than a prime sponsor could do from reading the na 
tional reporting services.
The Labor Department appropriation is almost never in 
place before the start of the fiscal year, with continuing 
resolutions governing for one, two, or three quarters or even 
through an entire fiscal year. But that is not the end of fiscal 
uncertainty. Deobligations of unspent funds make 
redistribution possible throughout the year. New congres 
sional initiatives often provide supplemental appropriations. 
The Labor Department persistently vacillates over whether 
and how much of the carryover funds from the previous year 
the prime sponsor will be allowed to spend. Only after the 
fact can the prime sponsor determine how much money has 
been available.
Planning and Performance
This does not mean that CETA planning does not exist. 
Planning is the management function that sets the direction 
for future activities of the organization. Like Moliere's hero 
who spoke prose all his life and did not know it, prime spon-
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sors must and do plan whether they know it or not. But it is 
contingency planning, fraught with uncertainty and laden 
with frustration. In addition to the delays in key data 
elements, the compliance review system and the geographical 
scope of the prime sponsorship present formidable obstacles 
to prime sponsor planning.
Ironically, the formal planning document submitted to the 
regional office may have little relation to the prime sponsor's 
realistic intention. A persistent complaint is that the Labor 
Department denies itself any meaningful oversight of pro 
gram substance by fractionalizing the programs. At the 
regional office, pieces of the local planning document are 
distributed for checking on compliance, but not for its 
coherence or substance. It is inevitably approved condi 
tionally and then frequently rejected for some procedural 
technicality. Meanwhile, the prime sponsor's real plan has 
been written into the contract documents with service 
deliverers, which specify who is to be served, what services 
are to be delivered, and what the performance criteria are to 
be.
The Montgomery County case study provides an example 
of a situation in which the regional office failed to take of 
ficial notice year after year not only of poor plans but also of 
poor performance. As long as the form was observed, the 
substance was ignored. Only when the prime sponsor failed 
to spend its full allocation because it was incapable of serv 
ing the more-disadvantaged population mandated by the 
1978 amendments did the regional office blow the whistle. 
Then, rather than offer technical assistance to solve the pro 
blems, the response was a punitive restriction of funding 
flows, which made planning and administration even more 
difficult and certainly did not help the population entitled to 
the services.
The experience seems not to be uncommon. The regional 
office reviews annually the operations of each prime spon-
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sor. The published "report cards" offer a revealing assess 
ment of what is deemed important by the national ad 
ministrators. The fiscal 1980 Title IIBC review revealed that 
28 prime sponsors experienced "serious problems," involv 
ing "major barriers to the accomplishment of program 
goals." Seattle and Ottawa were included in the list. The lat 
ter rural county was found guilty of not assigning a staff per 
son to perform EEO functions—not discriminatory ac 
tion—and for not having taken "corrective action regarding 
outreach, training and advancement of the handicapped." 
Seattle was cited for having "difficulty in operating the 
eligibility verification system . . . ." Nationally, training 
quantity was mentioned as a source of difficulties in five 
cases. Of these, three prime sponsors had not spent 15 per 
cent of Title IID funds on training. Another was faulted for 
inadequate IIB performance reporting; and the fifth prime 
sponsor was apparently guilty of underutilizing vocational 
education setaside funds. By comparison, inadequate EEO 
compliance systems (again, not necessarily lack of actual 
performance) were mentioned nine times, and 21 of the 28 
sponsors were cited for inadequate monitoring or eligibility 
determination systems. The quality of training was not men 
tioned as a serious problem for any prime sponsor.
The priority concerns of the Department of Labor are 
reflected in the point values assigned in the 1981 assessment 
package for IIBC:
Management
Independent monitoring unit 6 
Eligibility determination, verifica 
tion, and tracking 6 
Financial management 8 
Planning (composition of council
and process, only) 4 
Subagent management 8 





Recruitment and selection of 
participants (says nothing 
about assignment) 7 
Assessment and employability
development plans 7 
Job development and transition
services 7 
Services to youth 4 
Program activities (assess two 
categories) 18 
OJT (9) 
Classroom training (9) 
Upgrading and retraining (9) 
Work experience (9) 










The message the prime sponsor receives is that quality, 
especially of training, as well as long-run results, has a 
relatively low priority and may not even enter into the deter 
mination of the report cards that the feds issue to the prime 
sponsors. The possibility of negative local publicity is more 
of a driving force than any available rewards for good 
management or quality programming. Yet advance in 
dicators of training quality are not readily available or easily 
derived. To prescribe input measures would limit diversity. 
Ultimately, long-run outcomes will have to be the basis for 
judgment.
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Geographical Scope and Economies of Scale
The original CETA legislation provided a bonus to en 
courage adjacent jurisdictions to combine into labor- 
marketwide planning units. It is not working and the studies 
document some of the reasons. One is simply the value of the 
incentive. Tucson City and Pima County, Arizona lost less 
than 2 percent of their combined budget when they split up 
as a consortium. It was not a sufficient threat to dissuade the 
county supervisors from seeking control of their propor 
tionate share of the remaining funds. Money is power, and 
the exercise of power is what politics is about. If consortia 
are desirable, the incentives must be commensurate with 
their worth. Baltimore County and Snohomish County (ad 
jacent to Seattle) both withdrew from consortia even though 
surrounding counties remained in. The benefits of consortia 
were not enough to outweigh the attraction of autonomy. 
The Labor Department claims to be neutral as to the choice 
between consortia and individual prime sponsors, but the 
labor market planning concept would require positive en 
couragement of consortia.
San Francisco, Seattle, Worcester, Baltimore and In 
dianapolis came nearest to having jurisdiction over entire 
labor markets. The results seemed positive for the first two, 
but of no particular significance for the others, which made 
no special efforts to adapt their operations to special local 
conditions. Tucson and Montgomery County had jurisdic 
tion over less than a labor market. The loss did not seem 
serious in the case of Tucson, which drew enrollees from the 
city but prepared them for jobs in the suburbs as well. 
However, it unduly limited Montgomery County, which had 
to compete for access to jobs, training institutions, and 
employers with other prime sponsors in a complex 
metropolis encompassing the District of Columbia and a 
dozen political jurisdictions in Virginia and Maryland. The
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Penobscot consortium administered jointly and planned 
separately for each of three rural counties, and the results 
were impressive. Ottawa lacked training institutions and a 
budget to offer adquate training.
The two statewide operations made no attempt to plan for 
or administer programs for the areas covered. They 
delegated most planning and administration to local associa 
tions of government, which left too few and fragmented 
resources to obtain optimal results. Apathy at the highest 
state levels appears to be the primary explanation for the 
unimpressive performance by Utah. The North Carolina 
balance of state just seemed too massive and complex to be 
manageable, even had there been the will to do so.
Planning and related decisionmaking is another matter. A 
state, at least those as geographically large and diverse as 
North Carolina and Utah, is not a labor market. No single 
plan is likely to rationalize such diversity. Since the balance- 
of-state concept eliminates the major employment centers, 
employment and training planning is unlikely to produce a 
basis for sound decisions. Breaking up the less populous 
areas into labor market watersheds surrounding major 
employment centers might be more effective. Such an ap 
proach could probably be accomplished with adequate con 
sortium bonuses and encouragement, T>ut state staffs would 
have to develop the necessary expertise to provide sound 
guidance.
Related to the issue of geographic scope are potential 
economies of scale in staffing, planning, evaluation, 
management information systems, public relations and other 
functions. In 1980, 77 percent of prime sponsors received 
less than $5 million in Title IIB funds, 75 percent had less 
than $3 million of Title IID funds, and 82 percent received 
less than $5 million from Title VI. Of the remaining prime 
sponsors having higher funding, half were balance-of-state
71
prime sponsors with some of the problems noted above. 
More aggressive promotion of consortia would help meet the 
economy-of-scale criteria as well as further the concept of 
labor market planning.
The Decisions
So much for the decisionmakers and the decisionmaking 
process. What can be said about the quality of the decisions 
themselves? As noted, those can be generally categorized as: 
Whom to serve; what services to deliver; and, to whom to 
assign service delivery responsibility.
Whom to Serve?
The whom to serve decision is resolved through an interac 
tion of law, regulation, politics, and objective judgments, 
probably in that order. The legislation confines eligibility to 
the "economically disadvantaged," representing a persistent 
tradeoff between concentrating resources on those most in 
need at the cost of imposing a negative image on some pro 
grams. Department of Labor regulations do not direct 
priorities among the "significant segments" eligible to be 
served by CETA, nor do the feds direct priorities for fund 
allocations for the groups who should share in the distribu 
tion of those funds. Among the prime sponsors studied, the 
aggressiveness and power of target-group members in the 
pursuit of services was a major factor in determining the 
racial and ethnic mix of trainees.
Since they were a higher proportion of the CETA-eligible 
population, minority groups were overrepresented in all 
cases. However, how high their enrollment was in relation to 
their proportions of the eligible population seemed to be 
dependent primarily upon the effectiveness of the organiza 
tions representing each group. CETA staffs seemed to re 
spond to groups that applied pressure, thereby leaving less
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resources for those that did not. In Worcester, for example, 
black enrollments in IIB exceeded the proportion in the 
population by a factor of 10. Since no one represented the 
nonminority poor, they received less than a proportionate 
share of the resources. Seattle, early in its CETA history, 
designed a system based on relative need and probability of 
success, but the effort was abandoned with changes of staff.
In most cases, local chapters of national organizations car 
ried the battle for allocation. For poorly organized groups 
such as native Americans and, in some locations, Asian 
refugees, other organizations with service-delivery ambitions 
often pursued the fight. San Francisco is a unique example 
of a CETA scene dominated by homegrown community- 
based organizations without national affiliation—as 
evidenced by the success of gays and lesbians, as well as 
foreign language groups, in gaining special attention. Ag 
gressive and sophisticated, these local CBOs have been ex 
traordinarily effective both politically and as service 
deliverers, and the system has responded accordingly. Seattle 
also had effective homegrown CBOs, but they were less 
numerous and, therefore, less obvious than in San Fran 
cisco. Advisory councils, in most prime sponsorships, were 
involved in conflicts over the distribution of slots among the 
eligible populations, and settled potential political conflicts 
in a setting shielded from the public gaze.
Youth everywhere obtained a high proportion of the 
available program resources. However, this was not a func 
tion of organizational pressures, but of legislation and 
federal regulation. Youth had all of Title IV to themselves 
plus a federal regulatory requirement that the proportion of 
youth prevailing in Title II before the passage of the Youth 
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 be 
maintained. Since youth unemployment had been recognized 
at the local level as a serious problem before the passage of 
the youth legislation, prime sponsors had been allocating
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resources heavily in that direction. Most were therefore lock 
ed in with around one-half of their IIB slots reserved for 
youth. In general, the experience had been that expensive in 
vestments in training for youth below age 18 were not 
justified by their placement and retention rates. Therefore, 
the tendency was to relegate them to work experience pro 
grams, absorbing IIB resources that would probably have 
otherwise been spent on training.
There was a wide range of responses to selectivity by 
education. Areas like Utah and California with relatively 
high proportions of high school graduates tended not to use 
education as a selection criterion except in occupations 
where course content or licensure seemed to require educa 
tion. In contrast, Baltimore, with a relatively low average of 
high school completers, was the most selective for its 
classroom training programs. The intent was to train those 
most likely to profit from the expenditure, relegating the 
less-educated to a work experience program containing its 
own remedial training components. As a result, classroom 
training concentrated on a higher level of skills. In general, 
however, the tendency was to spread the training across the 
educational range, referring the high school graduates in 
dividually to ongoing vocational and technical training pro 
grams and to OJT, with the lesser-educated concentrated in 
class-size projects. Given the additional need and cost of 
remedial education and the propensity of this population to 
drop out, this policy tended to restrict the deficiently 
educated population to short-term, entry-level preparation.
In line with legislative requirements, it appears that prime 
sponsors carried out the intent of the law and drew enrollees 
from low-income families, although violations occasionally 
occurred and were played up in the media. With its generally 
favorable labor market, Dallas was most notable in concen 
trating its CETA training efforts on an extremely hard-to- 
employ population. It was also apparent throughout the
74
range of prime sponsors that the causes of disadvantage were 
many and that a wide range of competence and motivation 
existed among the eligible populations. It was no surprise to 
find that immigrants were most likely to combine income 
eligibility with potential for labor market success. It takes 
more careful screening to find that combination among the 
broader CETA population, but there are people who need 
only a boost to become economically independent.
The Service Mix
The prime sponsor has discretionary authority to allocate 
Title IIBC funds for training, work experience, or supportive 
services. None of the 12 prime sponsors utilized all the train 
ing funds allocated under the public service employment 
titles. Vocational education allocations through the gover 
nors' offices were a significant factor in promoting training, 
but no use was being made of the upgrading options of Title 
IIC. Since no separate funds were available for that purpose, 
there was no incentive to use the existing pool for upgrading 
the employed in preference to training the unemployed. The 
targeted jobs tax credit was also not popular in the 12 areas 
studied, though the Penobscot private industry council pro 
moted it aggressively during the summer of 1980. Lack of 
understanding by employers was the usual explanation of the 
neglect.
The need for minimum reading ability and arithmetic 
comprehension made it essential to include adult basic 
education as an integral part of IIB training. The flood of 
immigrants into many of the jurisdictions was the major fac 
tor for the growth of ESL. The need to provide a transition 
service for PSE enrollees as shrinking funds led to termina 
tions, as well as the low costs and high placement rates 
associated with job search training, served as the motivations 
for the addition of that component.
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Throughout, however, the prime sponsors, while declaring 
their preference for employability development, seemed to 
feel obligated to maintain balance among the full range of 
alternative services. They were under more pressure to 
spread the funds among familiar service deliverers than to 
adjust the service mix either to client need or to 
demonstrated effectiveness. Few prime sponsors had 
developed the technical capability to defend any other alter 
native.
Most of the prime sponsors tended to be more responsive 
to enrollee need than to labor market demand. Baltimore 
was the notable exception. Through an extensive system of 
employer advisory councils, demand was determined and 
training planned accordingly. The underlying rationale was 
that there were more eligible applicants than training slots 
and that no one can profit from training in an occupation 
that is not in demand by employers. Therefore, the CETA- 
eligible population is best served when employers are best 
served.
The high proportion of clerical and health care occupa 
tions in the training mix of all prime sponsors was probably 
both a symptom and an explanation of occupational choice. 
Since such jobs were available, planners tended to choose 
those occupations in making training decisions. However, 
the high proportion of women applicants also pushed plan 
ners in the same direction. Efforts to place women in non- 
traditional jobs were few and limited to special projects for 
that purpose. Little success could be claimed. Training for 
male oriented jobs seemed to be more strongly supply- 
centered. That is, there appeared to be a greater tendency to 
search out occupations in which men might be trained and 
placed because there were fewer occupations where the de 
mand for men was obvious.
76
The Service Deliverers
Prime sponsors must choose among a variety of deliverers 
of a variety of services. This report is concerned only with 
the choice among deliverers of training-related services. For 
classroom training, the prime sponsor usually has few op 
tions. No CETA prime sponsor has the necessary funding to 
create training insitutions. If a skill center is left over from 
MDTA days, it is used. If not, or in addition, individual 
referral occurs wherever there are institutions willing and 
able to accept CETA eligibles at reasonable cost. Where 
there are CBOs with any political clout, they are used unless 
they prove to be incompetent. Use of for-profit firms 
depends upon their costs and their aggressiveness. Never 
theless, within the limits of the availability of institutions, 
the studies demonstrate that prime sponsors do drop in 
competent service deliverers and continue on a small scale 
and at the margin to add and test new deliverers. They re 
spond to political pressures, but persistently they tend to ex 
pand use of the most cost-effective and shrink use of the op 
posite (to the extent they have dependable measures), all the 
while sensitive to the need to maintain diversity in offerings 
and institutions.
The most marked changes have been the strong shift to in 
dividual referral and to private proprietary schools. Another 
marked change has been the enlarged training role of 
organizations that are not schools. For the most part, this is 
both a cause and a consequence of the growth of nonskill 
training. Community-based organizations and consulting 
firms live or die by their ability to sell their services. They 
tend to be much more aggressive than tax supported institu 
tions or proprietary schools, which appeal to a broad 
population. They push their wares by resorting to lobbying 
and salesmanship, thereby expanding their role beyond what 
sheer competence would have won for them.
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The on-the-job component has undergone little change. 
Few employers have ever been interested in participation. An 
intermediary is necessary—a job service office, a 
community-based organization, or a prime sponsor 
itself—to contact employers and persuade them to accept the 
subsidy of one-half the enrollee's wages, which has become 
standard. Favorable responses generally come from small, 
struggling employers to whom the subsidy is attractive and 
larger firms who use CETA OJT as a recruiting source to 
meet affirmative action requirements. Whether the establish 
ment of private industry councils will be able to generate 
more OJT remains problematic. Based on early experience, 
there is little reason for optimism.

5. Lessons Learned
The purpose of the case studies was to gain insight into the 
CETA system, not to evaluate the performance of the 12 
prime sponsors. The studies illustrate a fascinating diversity. 
Penobscot showed the co-existence of strong staff leader 
ship, minor political involvement, effective advisory par 
ticipation, a weak economy, and limited service options, in 
ducing the prime sponsor to expand its training capacity. 
Worcester was characterized by prosaic leadership in a 
revitalized high-demand economy, but with a modest place 
ment record despite the favorable economic environment. 
Baltimore offered strong political and staff leadership, 
responsible for holding on to a consortium and making good 
use of generally mediocre service institutions in a redevelop 
ing economy. Montgomery County was in transition from 
strong but misdirected leadership to a more promising com 
bination in an economy of plentiful jobs usually requiring 
credentials.
North Carolina had a sprawling service area and diverse 
administrative problems too challenging for its politically 
burdened leadership, but was helped by the availability of 
sound training institutions. Dallas had a most favorable 
economic situation with a potential for becoming a CETA 
showcase, but was thwarted by political leadership that just 
wished CETA would go away. Indianapolis was putting 
itself back together after an initially mismanaged and dif 
ficult period, but was still operating at high unit costs. It 
relied almost totally on individual referral to community and 
private colleges to do so. Ottawa County lacked the training
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institutions to provide a comprehensive program. Utah was 
characterized by unaggressive leadership, but a strong 
economy and sound institutional support shored up the 
agency.
Tucson had strong continuous leadership and sound in 
stitutional support in a low-wage economy. Despite effective 
training, it was unable to demonstrate success measured by 
earnings gains for lack of evaluation followup. San Fran 
cisco had enjoyed strong staff leadership over the years, was 
highly politicized, but by organizations that were also 
capable service deliverers. It had a favorable job market for 
women but not for men. Seattle had based a strong, but ex 
pensive, program on individual assessment by the state 
employment service, individual referral to community col 
leges by one CBO, and classroom training at a skill center 
run by another CBO.
The System in Capsule
To the extent these prime sponsors are representative, the 
CETA system clearly can and does serve its clienteles 
reasonably well and has generally adapted its operations to 
local social, political, and economic conditions. Yet a 
number of shortcomings reduce the total payoff. There is 
considerable operational planning in the use of each year's 
budget, but not much strategic planning relating the use of 
CETA resources to the broad and long-term needs and ob 
jectives of the areas served. However, the uncertain annual 
funding process makes the operational planning also con 
tingency planning, as prime sponsors are forced to live with 
uncertainty and adapt to changing priorities directed from 
Washington.
Political and administrative pressures lead to minimizing 
per-enrollee costs, despite evidence that longer-duration 
training tends to pay off better than that of shorter duration.
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Based on immediate postenrollment observations, results of 
work experience compare favorably with those from training 
programs, yet national longitudinal data disclose that the 
former has long-run negative, and the latter positive, results 
in cost-benefit terms. OJT payoff is generally highest in the 
long run but the prime sponsor is rarely aware of this fact. 
The available evidence of short-run social benefits and in 
dividual gains is not sufficient to overcome marketing dif 
ficulties and to attract employers.
Local decisionmakers are prone to perceive the weaknesses 
in the system as being primarily federal in origin. It is true 
that the federal managers of CETA lack the necessary exper 
tise to provide guidance and technical assistance to prime 
sponsors and have tended to emphasize bureaucratic pro 
cesses rather than encourage creativity and provide substan 
tive leadership. A more concerted effort is needed to ex 
change federal and prime sponsor staff to familiarize each 
with the other's roles and problems. It is also essential that 
persons with training background be brought into the deci- 
sionmaking system at both levels.
As the intergovernmental system is presently structured 
and functioning, the regional office has no meaningful role 
to play in the system. Its personnel have little policy discre 
tion, even if they knew what was best for the program. 
Regional offices are merely a poor link in the communica 
tion chain from the national to the local level since there are 
so many routes for information in both directions that 
bypass the regional office.
At the top levels of the Labor Department's Employment 
and Training Administration, CETA administration began 
under the guidance of leaders who understood and were 
committed to the philosophy of the system. National leader 
ship dissolved into confusion and was just beginning to get 
itself together again when the 1980 election results introduc-
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ed uncertainty not only about the future directions of the 
program, but its very survival.
The Congress appears to be committed to local decision- 
making only in its rhetoric. It wants to handle the helm and 
leave the locals to respond, disregarding the administrative 
consequences of its constantly changing priorities.
Local Staff Development
The key determinant of CETA effectiveness is the strength 
and ability of the prime sponsor staff director. The attention 
of the elected officials can never be held for long, and when 
they do focus on the employment and training programs 
their primary interest is to avoid political embarrassment. 
Capable staff is essential but an effective leader will attract 
and develop a competent and stable staff. However, the 
measure of a leader in the prime-sponsor context is the abili 
ty to accommodate a wide range of diverse social, political, 
economic, and personal interests, not all of which are consis 
tent with maximum payoffs in terms of employment and in 
come gains for the CETA client population.
Of course, good management can be assisted to become 
better, and staff development can be institutionalized to 
speed and improve its effectiveness. Labor Department 
regional training centers have been useful occasionally in 
providing logistical support for recordkeeping and com 
pliance with (frequently unnecessary) regulations, but they 
have not been conducive to sound management, planning, 
and policymaking. Universities, on their own initiative or in 
response to institutional grants, have put together degree 
granting programs for preparing entrants to the field, but 
opportunities during recent years have been too plentiful in 
human resource activities, especially in managerial roles, for 
large numbers to enter the CETA system. Even where they
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did, preentry preparation can never obviate the need for on- 
site staff development.
The National Association of Counties' manpower unit has 
played a significant leadership and staff development role, as 
have the national mayoral and gubernatorial associations to 
a lesser degree. Attachment to these local and state associa 
tions has impeded the emergence of a CETA-wide profes 
sional association, which could set professional standards 
and promote their attainment. There is badly needed a 
mechanism through which experience can be shared, 
technical assistance can be provided, and staff can be 
developed by the only ones who know how—those who have 
been through the mill and have learned their lessons.
Experimentation is currently underway of a prime 
sponsor-to-prime sponsor technical assistance and training 
system. This approach has promise for training prime spon 
sor managers. The rising stars, trained by effective 
managers, are the most promising source for leadership in 
lagging prime sponsorships. The process already works to 
some degree. Efforts to institutionalize such relationships 
should be encouraged.
The federal officialdom needs training no less than the 
prime sponsor staffs. The feds are caught between Congress 
and the locals without the competence to respond adequately 
to either. There is need for a more effective focus for joining 
key prime sponsor staff with the federal executive staff in 
setting overall national directions consistent with local 
challenges. Only a national/local consensus on mission goals 
and objectives can serve as a lasting framework for local 
decisionmaking and as a basis for assessing prime sponsor 
performance. The compliance issues could be presented to a 
CETA-wide professional leadership group who could design 
means of accomplishing the goals without interference with 
performance. The Employment and Training Administra-
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tion sponsors a CETA director's work group which is con 
vened as a sounding board. Orchestrated by the feds, the 
local administrators are invited to listen to what is going to 
happen, but are not invited to suggest alternatives. Congress, 
too, could be more effectively educated and influenced by 
such an organized body. There is need to work upon and 
develop the inherent common professional interests that ex 
ist between national and local staff, substituting it for the 
adversary relationship which has emerged during the CETA 
years.
Curriculum Development
Sorely missed on the CETA scene is the federally con 
tracted but privately operated technical assistance and staff 
training system, which once developed and disseminated cur 
ricula throughout the MDTA system and trained local staff. 
Times have changed, and different arrangements are needed 
to take the place of this defunct institution. A possibility to 
be explored is a computer-assisted and computer-managed 
instruction being successfully promoted in general education 
and in Job Corps centers. Terminals linked to national or 
regional sources could offer access to common curricula in 
remedial education, English as a second language, and voca 
tional instruction related to "hands-on" training. But that 
would meet only part of the need. Person-to-person relation 
ships are also essential. Whatever approach proves best, 
there is a crying need for a positive technical-assistance-and- 
guidance approach to replace the adversary relationship, 
which has grown between prime sponsor and federal agen 
cies.
Such a system need not reduce local autonomy and discre 
tion. Unlike regulations handed down from above, technical 
assistance is neither arbitrary nor compulsory. Prime spon 
sors remain free to accept or reject. But given the hunger for
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leadership and direction, most prime sponsors would accept 
help without considering it a threat.
Management Information
Related is the need for a common, computer-linked 
management information system. Prime sponsors could feed 
in day-to-day operational data allowing constant monitoring 
of the system's inputs and outputs without the burden of 
useless reports. Performance standards and records of in 
dividual progress could both be incorporated. The local 
operators could call up national comparative data to test 
their own performance, as well as storing their own informa 
tion for future recall. The same facilities could serve the cur 
riculum and management functions at lower long-run costs 
than the current inadequate information flows.
Structure and Planning
Judging from the 12 cases, prime sponsors cannot respond 
solely to the needs of either the local labor markets or the 
CETA clientele. Rather, there must be a delicate balancing 
of the political needs of the chief elected official, the direc 
tives of the federal funding source, the needs and desires of 
the eligible population, the demands of the organizations 
that represent (or claim to represent) the clients, the 
marketing pressures from the alternative service deliverers, 
the limited cooperation available from employers, and the 
personal predilections of the prime sponsor staff. Judged, 
however, against the complexities of the environment, the 
fact that 12 prime sponsors could respond with acts that do 
accommodate the diverse, and frequently conflicting, in 
terests and still achieve benefits that exceed the costs, is little 
short of remarkable. But that does not deny that there are a
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number of potential improvements suggested by the data, 
which can provide promise of improved performance 
without denial of any legitimate interest.
The key problem remains that of setting priorities among 
competing objectives in an uncertain environment with 
numerous special interest groups demanding attention. Only 
strong, well-trained, and secure management can meet this 
challenge. Elected officials seem to play a limited role, but 
since the alternative within a decentralized system is a rigid 
and arbitrary bureaucratization, there appears to be no bet 
ter alternative than the present delegation of authority. 
When given the opportunity, advisory councils can become 
active and positive forces. However, three separate advisory 
councils are too much of a good thing and there is a need for 
consolidation. More important is the need to organize prime 
sponsors to cover complete labor markets rather than on the 
basis of a fragmented political jurisdiction. The consortium 
incentives need strengthening until they outweigh the 
political temptations to fragmentation.
The state level organization is inherently troublesome. 
While state participation in policymaking makes sense, most 
states are too diverse for the planning and delivery of ser 
vices to local labor markets. The balance of state is a residual 
concept with no rationale to support it and every experience 
to cause doubt about its effectiveness. An alternative ap 
proach might be to assign states the responsibility for helping 
political subdivisions to deliver CETA services on a labor- 
market basis. This would require subdividing states into 
areas surrounding major concentrations of population for 
program delivery, but maintaining a state role in coordina 
tion among these units. No simple block grant can encom 
pass the complex relationships between local and state 
governments.
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A Two-Tiered Training System
There are and will probably always be more eligible disad- 
vantaged workers willing to be trained in a stipended pro 
gram for low-level entry occupations than there will ever be 
funding to support. There will also be a continuing flow of 
those who, at low per capita cost, can be made more 
employable by remedial education, English as a second 
language, and job search training. Many of those may not 
have the capability, endurance or resources to undergo more 
extensive training for high-level occupations. Yet there is 
evidence that there are many within the currently eligible 
population who could and would profit from the more ex 
tensive training, and at higher social benefit-cost returns.
Involved are two sets of institutions, or at least two sets of 
institutional services. Some eligible enrollees are capable of 
undertaking occupational training. Others need a remedial 
stage to prepare for the advanced training. These latter, as 
well as those only capable of entry-level work, need the 
variety of supportive services described earlier, which are not 
readily available in mainstream training institutions.
There should be a two-tiered system. The system would 
provide short-term remedial and entry-level training accom 
panied by supportive services available to all who need them. 
This entry/remedial stage could be affected either by 
specialized or mainstream institutions. The equivalent of 1 
academic year, 36 weeks, should be generally sufficient for 
this stage. The second-tier of the system would offer the op 
portunity for extended career training to those initially ready 
for it or who successfully complete the entry level. It would 
be offered in mainstream institutions and would require only 
an additional year's tuition to implement the 2 years now 
legal, but never provided.
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Closely related is training allowance reform. Training 
allowances at the minimum wage level distort the incentives 
of training participants. Who is enrolled for the training and 
who for the stipend? Training allowance might be divided in 
to three components: (1) reimbursement of training-related 
expenses; (2) a subsistence stipend based on family income; 
and (3) a motivational component based on performance.
On-the-Job Training
OJT is the most effective of all for those who have access 
to it. Increasing that access depends upon attracting more 
employers by reducing their reluctance to hire CETA-eligible 
applicants. Aggressive marketing that places the enrollee on 
a "tryout" basis should be explored to encourage employers 
to hire disadvantaged applicants. During this period of 3 to 6 
months, the prime sponsor would provide a stipend to the 
employer in lieu of wages.
Future Directions
The CETA training activity, in general, seems to be an ef 
fective amalgam of the MDTA inheritance, the local voca 
tional training system, the inputs of community-based 
organizations, and the coordination and direction provided 
by local and state prime sponsors. It is strong in some places 
and weak in others, but there is no reason to think any cen 
trally derived pattern could work more effectively than the 
local designs. It is not the whip but guidance that prime 
sponsors need. There is no indication of reluctance to accept 
knowledgeable and positive direction. Technical assistance 
from successful prime sponsors could strengthen the locally 
weak systems. Some staff development and technical 
assistance can be centrally provided, but much will have to 
be brought to the local scene. Centrally developed curricula 
could be locally adapted without reducing local discretion.
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Centralized information does not necessarily threaten local 
initiative. Specific problems can only be solved at the local 
labor market level.
The temptation for radical surgery as part of CETA's 
reauthorization in 1982 should be resisted. One luxury 
CETA has never enjoyed is stability. There is no need to 
change the basic structure of the system, though there is need 
to delineate the roles and relationships of the players and the 
parameters of their managerial responsibilities. That does 
not preclude changing the service mix or eligibility criteria, 
but the basic delivery system relationship should remain in 
place long enough for capacity building to take place in a 
relatively orderly environment.
As a national policy, there needs to be more thought to a 
human capital development approach to CETA training. 
Concern for productivity, energy, and "^industrialization" 
are refocusing attention on developing and upgrading the 
work force. The rapid fall-off in the number of youth enter 
ing the labor force during the 1980s will make each new en 
trant that much more valuable. If they turn out to be sup 
plemented by a continued immigrant flow, the latter, too, 
will require an increased investment.
There are other systems for other components of the 
human resource pool. CETA was designed to aid the disad- 
vantaged, but overall national objectives are best ac 
complished when the disadvantaged enter the mainstream. 
The prime sponsors in the 12 case studies experimented with 
a number of approaches, including a hard-nosed selection 
process that relates the abilities of the potential enrollees to 
the requirements for training in particular occupations, and 
a lengthy sequencing of remediation skill training and low- 
or high-support on-the-job training. Each of these ap 
proaches appeared promising depending on local situations. 
Prime sponsors or their successors should be encouraged to
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continue with their efforts since ultimately programs will 
have to be developed for upgrading the labor force in their 
communities. The federally funded GET A system or its 
replacement can play a major role in achieving this goal.
However, since the study was completed, the federal 
government has opted for cutting fiscal 1982 CETA training 
funds by more than a third, while totally eliminating PSE as 
a training option. The record of the training in the 12 prime 
sponsorships, as well as the national evidence of participant 
income gains, does not justify the cut. On the contrary, when 
the national productivity growth has almost ground to a 
halt, a program that returns $1.14 on every dollar invested in 
institutional training and several times as much on OJT is a 
wise investment worth preserving and nourishing.
We should have learned from 20 years of employment and 
training experience that institution building is a slow and 
painful process. In many ways, demographic and economic 
developments are recreating the issues out of which MDTA 
emerged in 1962. Technological displacement and plant clos 
ings were major motivations for the legislation, which was 
directed toward "retraining." All of today's robots and 
computers were on the horizon, but the entry of the baby- 
boom generation and their mothers into the labor force 
made available an ample supply of low-wage jobseekers, en 
couraging more labor-intensive processes. Now the 
economic and demographic conditions portend a swingback 
to a more capital-intensive level.
Intensified international competition and technological 
advances again threaten increased plant closings and the 
need for worker relocation. All the signs are for continued 
influx of immigrants. Geographical barriers will become 
more, not less, serious for central city residents, even as their 
numbers decline. Youth entering the labor force, though in 
shrinking numbers, will require more, not less, training. At
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the other end of the age spectrum, delayed retirement will be 
more likely to involve second careers and retraining than 
continuation of the old jobs. The displaced homemaker has 
not disappeared from the scene.
Clearly, the demographic portents of the 1980s are for in 
creased training needs if we are to revive the growth in pro 
ductivity and prepare the labor force for the inevitable 
changing technology in the years ahead. Disbanding a system 
which took 20 years to build, inadequate as it still is, is likely 
to prove in a few years to have been shortsighted and costly.
